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Abstract
The soaring demands for always-on and fast-response online services have driven mod-
ern datacenter networks to undergo tremendous growth. These networks often rely on
scale-out designs with large numbers of commodity switches to reach immense capacity
while keeping capital expenses under check. Today, datacenter network operators spend
tremendous time and effort on two key challenges: 1) how to efficiently utilize the band-
width connecting each source and destination pair and 2) how to promptly handle network
failures with minimal disruptions to the hosted services.
To resolve the first challenge, we propose solutions in both network layer and transport
layer. In the network layer solution, we propose DARD, a Distributed Adaptive Routing
architecture for Datacenter networks [Wu and Yang (2012)]. DARD allows each end host
to reallocate traffic from overloaded paths to underloaded paths without central coordina-
tion. We use congestion game theory to show that DARD converges to a Nash equilibrium
in finite steps and its gap to the optimal flow allocation is bounded in the order of 1
logL
with
L being the number of links. We use a testbed implementation and simulations to show
that DARD can achieve a close-to-optimal flow allocation with small control overhead in
practice.
In the transport layer solution, We propose Explicit Multipath Congestion Control Pro-
tocol (MPXCP), which achieves four desirable properties: fast convergence, efficiency,
being fair to flows with different round trip times and negligible queue size. Intensive ns-
2 simulation shows that MPXCP can quickly converge to efficiency and fairness without
iv
building up queues regardless of different delay-bandwidth products.
To resolve the second challenge, recent research efforts have focused on automatic
failure localization. Yet, resolving failures still requires significant human interventions,
resulting in prolonged failure recovery time. Unlike previous work, we propose NetPi-
lot [Wu et al. (2012)], a system which aims to quickly mitigate rather than resolve fail-
ures. NetPilot mitigates failures in much the same way operators do – by deactivating or
restarting suspected offending components. NetPilot circumvents the need for knowing
the exact root cause of a failure by taking an intelligent trial-and-error approach. The core
of NetPilot is comprised of an Impact Estimator that helps guard against overly disrup-
tive mitigation actions and a failure-specific mitigation planner that minimizes the number
of trials. We demonstrate that NetPilot can effectively mitigate several types of critical
failures commonly encountered in production datacenter networks.
v
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1Introduction
According to an authoritative Internet trend report published in 2013 [Meeker and Wu
(2013)], the cloud computing market will continue to grow nearly 50% in the next year,
which then becomes a $25 billion market. Driven by this explosive increase in demand for
cloud applications, modern datacenters can easily have tens to hundreds of thousands of
servers. For example, Google has at least 16 significant datacenters all around the world.
Its total server number in 2011 is around 9 million [Hoelzle and Barroso (2009)]. To inter-
connect the large number of servers and also to facilitate both inter and intra datacenter
traffic, a large number of switches, routers and other devices form a complex datacen-
ter network (DCN). How to design a scalable, manageable and economical datacenter
network is a challenging problem. More specifically, 1) how to efficiently utilize the band-
width connecting each source and destination pair and 2) how to promptly handle network
failures with minimal disruptions to the hosted services are on top of the challenge list.
This thesis is dedicated to address these two challenges.
1
1.1 From Scale-up to Scale-out Datacenter Network Architecture
Over the past decade, datacenter network design went, roughly, through two stages: scale-
up architecture and scale-out architecture. The overall trend is: people rely more and more
on commodity hardware and complex software to manage datacenter networks.
1.1.1 Traditional Scale-up Datacenter Network Architecture
In Ethernet, hosts are allocated with MAC addresses and the switches forward Ethernet
frames based on their destination MAC addresses. To forward traffic, Ethernet switches
essentially have two functions. First, they cooperate to construct a spanning tree to pro-
vide loop-free paths. Second, if a switch does not have a forwarding entry for a frame’s
destination MAC address, it floods that frame over the entire spanning tree. A switch also
learns how to reach a MAC by remembering the source MAC’s incoming interface.
However, the above Ethernet protocols do not scale to large networks: MAC addresses
are flat and thus cannot be aggregated. Also, the spanning tree protocol wastes a large
amount of bandwidth by blocking switch ports. To overcome these two limitations, tra-
ditional datacenter networks are designed as follows: a large number of small Ethernet
islands are interconnected by routers. Each Ethernet island is assigned with one or more
IP subnets. Packets among Ethernet islands are forwarded by layer-3 protocols.
The best design practice for traditional datacenter architecture is described in the Cisco
Datacenter Infrastructure Design Guide [Cisco Systems, Inc. (2011)]. The signature of
this design is that by moving up to a higher hierarchy, the switches become higher speed
and denser in number of ports. The advantage of this design is obvious: all devices and
protocols are off-the-shelf and reliable. However, the highest density switches at the top
of the hierarchy are expensive and limit the network size. As far as we know, the state of
the art nonblocking 10Gbps switch has only 128 ports, on which it is almost impossible to
support large datacenters as announced by Google and Microsoft.
2
1.1.2 Existing Scale-out Datacenter Network Architectures
One practical solution to resolve the above scalability limitation is to expand the topology
into a multi-rooted tree to provide multiple equal-cost paths between any host pair [Al-
Fares et al. (2008); Greenberg et al. (2009)]. Figure 2.1 shows a 3-stage multi-rooted
tree topology. The topology has three vertical layers: Top-of-Rack (ToR), aggregation
(agg), and core. A pod is a replicable management unit inter-connected by the cores.
However, this scale-out topology itself does not solve the scalability problem because
existing routing and transport protocols have limited support for multiple paths at the scale
of a datacenter. As a result, both the industry and academia have been actively looking for
solutions to efficiently and fairly utilize the network capacity. At a high-level view, there
are two categories of solutions: distributed flow-to-path assignment and centralized flow-
to-path assignment.
Equal Cost Multipath (ECMP) is a practical solution of random flow-to-path assign-
ment. ECMP-enabled switches hash flows based on flow identifiers to multiple equal-cost
next hops. This design paradigms improve the bisection bandwidth, but can still cause
permanent hash collisions on congested links [Al-Fares et al. (2010)].
VL2 [Greenberg et al. (2009)] is another solution running in production. It uses ToR
switches to forward flows to randomly selected cores to approximate packet-level valiant
load balancing (VLB) [Lakshman et al. (2004)]. Operators prefer flow-level VLB over
packet-level VLB to prevent potential packet reordering. It achieves similar bisection
bandwidth as ECMP [Al-Fares et al. (2010); Wu and Yang (2012)].
Multipath TCP [Wischik et al. (2011)] views the datacenter capacity as a resource
pool and tries to efficiently and fairly utilize this resource pool by extending TCP’s AIMD
concept into multipath scenarios. This approach can potentially penetrate the existing
industry practice of datacenter architecture design. In the network layer, routing’s goal is
no longer to compute the least costly path but to enumerate all the paths connecting any
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host pair. In the transport layer, a source and destination pair can simply split one flow
along all the paths using MPTCP.
Hedera [Al-Fares et al. (2010)] introduces a centralized controller to approximate
an optimal flow-to-path assignment given dynamic traffic load. The software-defined-
network community has provided increasingly reliable infrastructures for the centralized
controlling [Openflow (2008)]. Hedera achieves close-to-optimal flow allocation
1.1.3 Proposed Practical Datacenter Architectures
In this thesis, we propose two solutions in both network layer and transport layer to effi-
ciently utilize the bandwidth connecting each source and destination pair in the scale-out
topology.
In the network layer solution, we advocate conservatively making incremental im-
provement to datacenter networks based on existing reliable routing technologies. We
propose DARD, a Distributed Adaptive Routing architecture for Datacenter networks [Wu
and Yang (2012)]. DARD allows each end host to reallocate traffic from overloaded paths
to underloaded paths without central coordination.
In the transport layer solution, we take a clean slate approach and propose MPXCP,
Explicit Multipath Congestion Control Protocol, which leverages both multipath TCP and
explicit congestion control. MPXCP can quickly converge to efficiency and fairness with-
out building up queues despite different delay-bandwidth products.
1.2 From Failure Diagnosis to Failure Mitigation in Datacenter Networks
Given the large number of network devices in datacenters, failures become the norm rather
than the exception. In the second half of this thesis, we will describe both our measurement
and system work about datacenter network failure recovery. A well-accepted definition of
a network failure is defined by pre-existing measurement frameworks. There are two types
of such frameworks: passive measurement and active measurement. A passive measure-
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ment framework logs network events such as link down or switch reboot. The most com-
mon practice is syslog [Lonvick (2001)]. An active measurement framework proactively
measures certain indexes that can reflect the running state of the network. For example, if a
keep-alive message between two servers fails, either the servers or the network connecting
those servers are in an abnormal state.
1.2.1 Traditional Three-step Failure Recovery Procedure
Traditionally, network operators follow a three-step procedure to react to network failures:
1) detection; 2) diagnosis; and 3) repair. Diagnosis and repair are often time-consuming,
because the sources of failures vary widely, from faulty hardware components to software
bugs to configuration errors. Operators must sift through many possibilities just to narrow
down potential root causes. These diagnosis and repair sometimes require third-party
device vendors’ assistance, further lengthening the failure recovery time. Because of the
above challenges, it can take a long time to recover from disruptive failures.
1.2.2 Proposed Four-step Failure Recovery Procedure
Realizing the problem above, we take a fundamentally different approach to tackle the
failure recovery problem in large-scale DCNs. We advocate a four-step process to react
to failures: 1) detection; 2) mitigation; 3) diagnosis; and 4) repair. We argue that it is
more important to mitigate failures than to fix them in real-time. Here “mitigate” means
taking actions that alleviate the symptoms of a failure, possibly at the cost of temporarily
reducing spare bandwidth or redundancy. Timely and effective failure mitigation enables
a DCN to operate continuously even in the presence of failures, and allows operators to
dive directly into failure diagnosis and repair.
We present NetPilot, an automated system that adopts our four-step process to quickly
mitigate failures in a large-scale DCN. We identify and address two key technical chal-
lenges. First, automatic failure mitigation carries substantial risk because a mitigation
5
action may have a severe consequence and compromise the health of the entire network.
NetPilot prevents this problem by accurately predicting the impact of mitigation actions
and executing them within a pre-defined safety guardrail. Second, an excessive number
of trials will unnecessarily lengthen failure disruption periods. NetPilot avoids this prob-
lem by ordering the possible mitigation actions based on their likelihood of success and
potential impact.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents DARD, the
practical adaptive routing architecture. Chapter 3 describes MPXCP, the explicit multipath
transport protocol. Chapter 4 shows NetPilot, the automated network failure mitigation
system. Chapter 5 summarizes this thesis.
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2DARD: A Practical Distributed Adaptive Routing
Architecture for Datacenter Networks
2.1 Introduction
Deploying applications in datacenters has become a well-accepted trend because it is eco-
nomical and efficient. Modern applications usually require intensive inter-server com-
munication, e.g., MapReduce and indexing. Driven by these applications, the bisection
bandwidth demand is undergoing an explosive growth. To achieve this goal under budget,
today’s datacenter network often leverages commodity switches to form a multi-rooted
tree to provide multiple equal-cost paths between any host pair [Al-Fares et al. (2008);
Greenberg et al. (2009)]. Figure 2.1 shows a 3-stage multi-rooted tree topology. The
topology has three vertical layers: Top-of-Rack (ToR), aggregation (agg), and core. A pod
is a replicable management unit inter-connected with the cores.
However, existing routing and transport protocols have limited support for multipath
at the scale of a datacenter. As a result, both the industry and academia have been ac-
tively looking for solutions to efficiently and fairly utilize the network capacity. At a
high-level view, there are two types of mechanisms to explore the path diversities in dat-
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FIGURE 2.1: A multi-rooted tree topology for a datacenter network.
acenters: centralized flow-to-path assignment, which leverages a centralized controller to
approximate the optimal flow allocation, and random flow-to-path assignment, in which
switches hash flows based on flow identifiers to multiple equal-cost paths. Both of these
design paradigms improve the bisection bandwidth. However, each has its limitations.
The centralized approach introduces a potential scaling bottleneck [Curtis et al. (2011)].
The random flow allocation causes permanent hash collisions on congested links [Al-Fares
et al. (2010)].
Despite the disadvantages of the above solutions, their key concepts have been de-
ployed or are about to be deployed in production datacenters. We believe that the funda-
mental reason that makes these solutions practical is because all of them are conservatively
making incremental improvement based on existing reliable technologies. In addition, We
abstract four design guidelines for practical datacenter architectures, including reliabil-
ity, capability of improving bisection bandwidth, scalability and debugging-friendly. We
will introduce these four guidelines and explain the pros and cons of existing datacenter
architectures in detail in Chapter 2.2.
This chapter presents DARD, a readily deployable routing architecture that enables
end hosts to independently allocate dynamic flows. We aim to make DARD practical
by strictly following the above four design guidelines. The key design challenge is how
to distributively achieve close-to-optimal load balancing with low overhead. To address
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this challenge, each end host runs a selfish flow allocation algorithm that demonstrably
converges to a Nash equilibrium with bounded gap to the optimal in finite steps. We
implement a DARD prototype on testbed and a DARD simulator on ns-2. Further, We use
static traffic patterns to show that DARD can quickly converge to a stable state. We also
use dynamic traffic patterns to show that the bisection bandwidth gap between DARD’s
flow allocation and the optimal flow allocation is small.
To the best of our knowledge, DARD is the first distributed adaptive routing architec-
ture for datacenters. Our contributions are:
1. We justify four design guidelines for practical datacenter architectures and explain
the pros and cons of existing solutions.
2. We design DARD, which is proven to converge to a Nash equilibrium in finite steps
with bounded gap to the optimal flow allocation.
3. We conduct intensive evaluation in both testbed and simulation to show DARD’s
quick convergence, high bisection bandwidth, and small control overhead.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We explain four design guidelines for
practical datacenter architectures in Chapter 2.2. Chapter 2.3 describes DARD’s design in
detail. In Chapter 2.4, we prove that DARD converges to a Nash equilibrium in finite steps
and its gap to the optimal flow allocation is bounded. In Chapter 2.5, we introduce how we
implement the system in both testbed and simulator. We evaluate DARD in Chapter 2.6.
Chapter 2.7 concludes our work.
2.2 Guidelines for Practical Datacenter Architectures
From the operational perspective, a practical datacenter architecture solution should take
at least four aspects into consideration.
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First of all, the solution should be reliable. Being reliable is always the number one
requirement of datacenter operation. As a result, operators have a very strong incentive
to rely on well-proven technologies. They prefer to conservatively and incrementally im-
prove off-the-shelf solutions rather than to aggressively deploy any advanced technology
with potentially buggy code.
On top of being reliable, as long as the solution can fulfill the bandwidth requirement
from the applications, it is a good candidate. The more capable of improving bisection
bandwidth, the more likely the solution will be deployed.
Third, the solution should be scalable, i.e., it can be easily replicated to an upgraded
datacenter despite the datacenter’s scale. Otherwise, every datacenter upgrading may
cause a fundamental change to the already-proven architecture, which is an unacceptable
operation overhead.
The last aspect, which has been significantly negligent, is debugging-friendly. Net-
work debugging itself is challenging enough [Handigol et al. (2012)]. More devices in
datacenters imply more failures and bugs, which has become a significant operational
overhead [Wu et al. (2012)]. Counter-intuitively, the datacenter’s highly symmetric archi-
tecture does not simplify the network debugging. The key reason is: a datacenter network
provides too many possibilities for a packet to traverse. Without the capability to trace the
exact path a packet takes, it is very difficult to localize a problem.
Given all the above four guidelines for practical datacenter network designs, it becomes
understandable why operators prefer some architectures over others. In the rest of this
section, we will review the state of the art datacenter network architectures to understand
their fundamental advantages and limitations.
Equal-Cost-Multi-Path forwarding (ECMP) [Hopps (2000)] is one known solution run-
ning inside production datacenters [Cisco Systems, Inc. (2011)]. ECMP-enabled switches
hash flows based on flow identifiers to multiple equal-cost next hops. It is reliable because
all its building blocks have been proven in production: TCP, intra and inter domain routing
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protocols and consistent hashing. Even though it causes permanent collision and degrades
the bisection bandwidth [Wu and Yang (2012)], it has become the default solution when
advanced architectures fail [Al-Fares et al. (2010)]. ECMP scales reasonably well. To the
best of our knowledge, switches supporting 64-way ECMP has been off-the-shelf. How-
ever, ECMP is not debugging-friendly. Without knowing the exact hushing function on
each switch and without the capability of logging the packet headers in real time, it is very
difficult to trace a packet. Hence, end-to-end ping and traceroute become less useful.
VL2 [Greenberg et al. (2009)] is another solution running in productions. It uses ToR
switches to forward flows to randomly selected cores to approximate packet-level valiant
load balancing (VLB) [Lakshman et al. (2004)]. Again, operators prefers flow-level VLB
over packet-level VLB to prevent potential packet reordering. It achieves similar bisec-
tion bandwidth as ECMP [Al-Fares et al. (2010); Wu and Yang (2012)]. However, it
significantly improves the scalability compared with ECMP, because tunneling packets to
randomly selected cores only depends on the widely available encapsulation/decapsulation
feature. Operators can easily expand a datacenter in the horizontal direction without wor-
rying about the limited ECMP capability. VL2 does not facilitate network debugging
either, because tracking the path taken by a packet requires logging the randomly selected
core in real time, which is not trivial in practice.
Hedera [Al-Fares et al. (2010)] introduces a centralized controller to approximate
an optimal flow-to-path assignment given dynamic traffic load. The software-defined-
network community has provided increasingly reliable infrastructures for the centralized
controlling [Openflow (2008)]. Hedera achieves close-to-optimal flow allocation and is
also debugging friendly because the controller knows every detail about the flow alloca-
tion. However, Hedera’s major concern is its scalability. [Curtis et al. (2011)] and [Benson
et al. (2010)] systematically analyze the overhead of centralized flow allocation and im-
plies that Hedera needs parallelism route computation to support realistic datacenter traffic
patterns. Besides, we will show in our evaluation that Hedera’s control overhead is pro-
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portional to the number of flows, which is not bounded. With the expanding of the size
of a datacenter and the explosive increase of traffic demand, how to scale Hedera is a
challenging problem.
Multipath TCP [Wischik et al. (2011)] views the datacenter capacity as a resource pool
and tries to efficiently and fairly utilize this resource pool by extending TCP’s AIMD con-
cept into multipath scenarios. This approach can potentially penetrate the existing industry
practice of datacenter architecture design. In the network layer, routing’s goal is no longer
to compute the least costly path but to enumerate all the paths connecting any host pair.
In the transport layer, a source and destination pair can simply split one flow along all the
paths using MPTCP. To the best of our knowledge, MPTCP is still not completely stan-
dardized in IETF and experimental code has just been released. Considering the legacy
TCP has experienced numerous of major improvement even after it was standardized, the
conservative industry may not deploy MPTCP in the near future. Given the current status
of MPTCP, we can hardly conduct a fair analysis about its scalability and whether it is
debugging-friendly.
2.3 DARD Design
As we have explained in Chapter 2.2, none of existing practical datacenter architectures
can fulfill the four design guidelines. In this section, we first explain how we make our
design choices to ensure that DARD can fulfill all the guidelines. We then describe the
DARD design in detail.
2.3.1 Design Choices
We choose the scheduling granularity to be a TCP flow for reliability reasons. The legacy
TCP has been the dominant transport protocol in datacenters. Besides, its implementation
has been intensively tested in production. As a result, datacenter operators are very conser-
vatively improving TCP [Alizadeh et al. (2010)]. Since packet reordering can significantly
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degrade TCP’s performance, we choose to allocate one flow to one path to prevent any sys-
tematic risk of packet reordering.
We use the term elephant flow or elephant to refer to a continuous TCP connection
transferring bytes more than a certain threshold. We focus on allocating elephant flows
to improve bisection bandwidth for two reasons. First, existing measurement shows that
1% of the datacenter flows take more than 90% of all the bytes [Greenberg et al. (2009)].
Consequently, reallocating elephants can significantly improve the aggregated flow rate by
preventing permanent collisions [Al-Fares et al. (2010)]. Second, random flow allocation
already performs reasonably well for small, short RPC-like flows when their quantity is
significantly larger than the number of paths, in which case the hash collisions are averaged
over the bottlenecks [Al-Fares et al. (2010); Wu et al. (2012)].
To make DARD scalable to large topologies, we choose the distributed tunneling ap-
proach as VL2 such that path diversities are encoded by encapsulation but is not limited
by the number of equal cost paths supported by commodity switches. Besides, without
centralized coordination, DARD is not possibly to be bottlenecked by the centralized con-
troller.
The key step to design a debugging-friendly datacenter architecture is to make packets
traceable, i.e., to trace the exact path a packet takes with little overhead. DARD achieves
this goal by encoding the path in an encapsulated IP header. Different from VL2 which
encapsulates packets at ToRs, DARD encapsulates packets at hosts. As a result, we can
leverage the rich functions provided by end hosts to trace packets. For example, TCPdump
can be easily deployed in end hosts but not in commodity switches. Besides, pushing IP
routing all the way to the end hosts facilitates network layer debugging tools,e.g., ping and
traceroute, to trace every single hop along a path.
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2.3.2 Overview
DARD has a conceptual control loop of three steps. First, it detects elephant flows at end
hosts. Second, each end host queries the switches for their workload. Third, each end
host reallocates flows to relieve congested paths. The purpose of the first two steps is to
provide timely information for the third step. We loose this conceptual control loop by
making each of the three steps an independent process. Each of the three processes has its
own control loop. Since the overhead of elephant detection is small, an end host constantly
monitors all the outgoing flows. We use the term query interval to refer to the time interval
between two consecutive set of queries initiated from the same end host. We use the term
control interval to refer to the time interval between two consecutive flow reallocations
conducted by the same host pair.
For the purpose of easy expression, we introduce the definitions that will be frequently
referred to in the rest of this chapter. We use Bl to note link l’s capacity. Nl denotes the
number of elephant flows on l. We define l’s fair share Sl  Bl{Nl, which is the bandwidth
each elephant should be allocated if they fairly share that link (Sl  0, if Nl  0). Link l’s
link state (LSl) is defined as a triple [Bl, Nl, Sl]. Switch r’s switch state (SSr) is defined
as {LSl | l P r’s outgoing links}. A path p refers to a set of links connecting a source
and destination ToRs. The first and last hop links are not included in a path because we
only consider the situation in which flows are bottlenecked by the network but not the NIC
capacity. If link l has the smallest Sl among all the links of path p, we use LSl to represent
p’s path state (PSp). This smallest Sl is also referred as path p’s path congestion.
Figure 2.2 shows DARD’s components. A switch in DARD has only two functions: 1)
It forwards packets to the next hop according to a pre-configured forwarding table; 2) It
tracks its running state and replies to host queries.
An end system has three components. The elephant detector constantly monitors all
the outgoing flows and considers a flow as elephant once its size grows beyond a threshold.
14
 	
	




	

	

 	

	 	


	
	
FIGURE 2.2: This figure shows DARD’s three components on a host. The elephant de-
tector constantly detects elephant flows. The switch monitor periodically queries switches
for their states. The flow allocator periodically reallocates flows from overloaded paths to
underloaded paths.
The switch monitor periodically sends switch state queries (SSQ) to switches and processes
the corresponding switch state replies (SSR). The flow allocator periodically reallocates
flows from overloaded paths to underloaded paths.
Since the two switch functions and the elephant detector at an end host are simple, we
focus the rest of this chapter on the other three building blocks: DARD’s addressing and
routing, switch monitor and flow allocator.
2.3.3 Addressing and Routing
In this section, we will introduce how DARD leverages datacenter’s hierarchical topology
to encode path information into IP address and how DARD achieves the goal of being
scalable and debugging-friendly by tunneling.
Figure 2.3 uses a fattree topology to illustrate DARD’s addressing and routing. There
are four trees in this topology, each of which is rooted from one of the cores, e.g., all
the switches and hosts highlighted by the dotted boxes form a tree with its root core1.
This strictly hierarchical structure facilitates multipath routing via customized address-
ing [Al-Fares et al. (2008)]. We borrow the idea from NIRA [Yang et al. (2007)] to split
an end-to-end path into uphill and downhill segments and to encode a path in the source
15
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FIGURE 2.3: This figure illustrates DARD’s addressing and routing on a fattree topology.
The dotted boxes highlight the tree rooted from core1. E11 andE21’s addresses highlighted
by dotted circles uniquely encode the uphill path ToR11 Ñ agg11 Ñ core1 and the down-
hill path core1 Ñ agg21 Ñ ToR21. The switches highlighted with starts are the switches
that E31 sends SSQs to when elephant flows are from E31 to E41.
and destination addresses. In DARD, each of the core switches obtains a unique prefix
and allocates non-overlapping subdivisions of the prefix to its sub-trees. A sub-tree re-
cursively allocates non-overlapping subdivisions of its prefix to lower hierarchies. By this
hierarchical address allocation, every device receives multiple IP addresses, each of which
represents the device’s position in one of the trees.
For example, in Figure 2.3 we use corei to represent the ith core, aggij to represent
the jth aggregation switch in the ith pod. We follow the same rule to interpret ToRij for
the top of rack switches and Eij for the end hosts. We use the device identifiers prefixed
with letter P and delimited by periods to illustrate how prefixes are allocated along the hi-
erarchies. The first core is allocated with prefix Pcore1. It then allocates non-overlapping
prefixes Pcore1.Pagg11, Pcore1.Pagg21 Pcore1.Pagg31, Pcore1.Pagg41 to its four sub-
trees. The sub-tree rooted from agg11 further allocates four prefixes to lower hierarchies.
One advantage of this hierarchical addressing is that one address uniquely encodes
the sequence of upper-level switches that allocate the address, e.g., in Figure 2.3, E11’s ad-
dress Pcore1.Pagg11.PToR11.PE11 uniquely encodes the sequence of address allocation:
core1 Ñ agg11 Ñ ToR11. A host address pair can further uniquely identify a path, e.g.,
in Figure 2.3, we can use the host address pair highlighted by dotted circles to uniquely
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Table 2.1: agg11’s forwarding tables.
Downhill Table
Prefixes next-hop
Pcore1.Pagg11.PToR11 ToR11
Pcore1.Pagg11.PToR12 ToR12
Pcore2.Pagg11.PToR11 ToR11
Pcore2.Pagg11.PToR12 ToR12
Uphill Table
Prefixes next-hop
Pcore1 core1
Pcore2 core2
encode the dotted path from E11 to E21 via core1. We call the partial path encoded by the
source address the uphill path and the partial path encoded by the destination address the
downhill path. To reallocate a flow to a different path, we can simply use different address
combinations without reconfiguring any forwarding table.
Each switch maintains a uphill table and an downhill table. The uphill table keeps
the prefix entries for the upstream switches and the downhill table keeps the prefix entries
for the downstream switches. Table 2.1 shows agg11’s two tables. To forward a packet, a
switch first looks up the destination in the downhill table using the longest prefix matching.
If a match is found, the packet will be forwarded to the corresponding downstream switch.
Otherwise, the switch will look up the source address in the uphill table for the next-hop
upstream switch. A core switch maintains only the downhill table.
Each host in DARD is also assigned a location independent IP address (ID), which
uniquely identifies the host and is used for making TCP connections. The mapping from
IDs to underlying IP addresses is maintained by a DNS system and cached locally. To
deliver a packet, the source encapsulates the packet with a source and destination address
pair. Switches forward the packet according to the encapsulating header. The destination
decapsulates the packet on its arrival.
In fact, the above twice-looking-up forwarding is not necessary for a fattree, because
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a core switch in fattree uniquely determines one path for a host pair. However, not all the
multi-rooted trees share the same property. For a general datacenter topology, operators
can follow a similar addressing schema to allocate prefixes along the hierarchies. In case
more IP addresses are assigned to one network interface, we propose to use IP alias to con-
figure multiple IP addresses to one network interface. Modern operating systems support
a large number of IP alias to associate with single network interface, e.g., Linux kernel 2.6
sets the limit to be 256K IP alias per interface. Windows NT 4.0 has no limitation on this
number.
DARD’s addressing and routing design is scalable because it achieves multipath rout-
ing by encapsulating path information into packet headers at end hosts. This solution is
not affected by the topology scale. Encapsulating path information at end host is also
debugging-friendly because operators can easily trace the exact path each packet takes.
2.3.4 Switch Monitor
To enable end hosts to adaptively allocate flows, DARD requires a timely channel to in-
form every host of the network’s running state. Compared with letting switches periodi-
cally push their running states to hosts, letting hosts actively query switches can potentially
decrease the control traffic by on-demand polling. As a result, we design the component of
switch monitor on every host to actively query switches for their states. This section first
describes a straw man design of the switch monitor. Then we decrease the straw man’s
control traffic by on-demand polling.
The straw man design is straightforward: Each switch tracks its state locally. A host’s
switch monitor periodically sends switch state queries (SSQs) to every switch and assem-
bles the corresponding switch state replies (SSRs) to compute every path’s congestion. If
every host sends one query to every switch and receives the corresponding replies in one
query interval, the straw man’s control traffic for that interval can be estimated in for-
mula (2.1), where pkt size is the packet size of one SSQ plus its corresponding SSR. The
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implication is that the straw man’s control traffic is bounded by the topology size.
num of hosts num of switches pkt size (2.1)
We observe three optimization opportunities from the above straw man design: 1) If
a host is not transferring elephants, it is not necessary to monitor any switch. 2) If a host
is transferring elephants, it does not have to query every switch in the topology. As the
example shown in Figure 2.3, E31 is sending elephants to E41. E31 has to monitor only
the switches marked by the starts because the rest of the switches are not on any path
connecting the source and destination. We do not mark ToR41 because its outgoing link
to the destination is directly connected to the host NIC. 3) Suppose a switch sw is on the
paths from source src to destination dst1 and is also on the paths from src to destination
dst2, Then one SSR from sw to src can be used for computing the path congestions for
both (src, dst1) and (src, dst2), two source and destination pairs.
Based on the above three observations, we optimize the straw man by reducing the
number of SSQs: 1) a host’s switch monitor keeps idle until the host starts to transfer
elephants. 2) A source monitors only the switches along the paths to the destination.
The switch whose outgoing link is the cut of every path to the destination or is directly
connected to the host NIC is not included. 3) The number of SSQs a source sends to a
switch in one query interval is at most one.
Our switch monitor’s design requires every switch to count flow numbers and to inter-
act with hosts. These two functions are supported by OpenFlow switches.
2.3.5 Flow Allocator
This section describes DARD’s last building block, the flow allocator running on each
end host. It takes the detected elephants and switch states as the input and reallocates
flows to relieve overloaded paths. The important observation that motivates our design
is: given an elephant’s elastic demand and small latencies in datacenters, elephants tend
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Algorithm 1: Selfish Flow Allocation
1: Smax = maximum Sl in {pvris.Sl};
2: imax = Smax’s index in pv;
3: Smin = minimum Sl in {pvris.Sl | fvris ¡ 0};
4: imin = Smin’s index in pv;
5: if (imax  imin) return;
6: estimation  pvrimaxs.Bl
pvrimaxs.Nl 1
7: if (estimation Smin ¡ δ)
8: reallocate one elephant from path imin to path imax.
to fully and fairly utilize their bottlenecks. As a result, moving flows from a path with
small fair share to a path with large fair share can improve the fairness and increase the
minimum flow rate. Chapter 2.4.1 justifies this intuition. Based on the above intuition,
DARD’s high-level approach is to enable every host to selfishly increase the minimum
fair share it observes. Algorithm 1 illustrates a host pair’s flow allocation process in one
control interval.
In DARD, every source and destination pair maintains two vectors at the source: the
path state vector (pv), whose ith item is the path state of the corresponding path connect-
ing the source and destination, and the flow vector (fv), whose ith item is the number
of elephants sent by the source along the corresponding path. Line 6 estimates the fair
share of the imaxth path if another elephant flow is added to it. The δ in line 7 is a positive
threshold to decide whether to reallocate a flow. If we set δ to 0, line 7 ensures that the
algorithm increases the minimum fair share observed by the source. If we set δ to be larger
than 0, the algorithm stops reallocating flows once the estimation becomes close enough
to the observed minimum fair share. We will describe how to choose δ in Chapter 2.6.1
and Chapter 2.4.3. Ideally, If every end host in the datacenter periodically takes this proce-
dure, we expect that given a traffic pattern, every end host can eventually stop reallocating
flows, i.e., DARD converges. We also expect that a small δ achieves larger fair share when
DARD converges, and a large δ accelerates the convergence process.
Another design aspect to consider is that distributed load-sensitive routing can lead
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to permanent path oscillation [Khanna and Zinky (1989)], which can potentially result in
degraded bisection bandwidth because TCP may suffer from reordering or even packet
loss every time the path changes. Figure 2.4 shows an example. There are three source
and destination pairs: (E1, E2), (E3, E4) and (E5, E6). Each of the pairs has two paths
and is transferring two elephants. The source in each pair runs Algorithm 1 independently
without knowing the others’ reactions. In the beginning, the shared path, link switch1-
switch2, has no elephant. As a result, each of the three sources reallocates one flow to
it and thus, the number of elephants on the shared path increases to three. This triggers
the three sources to reallocate flows back to their original paths. This process repeats and
causes permanent oscillation and bandwidth under-utilization.
FIGURE 2.4: This figure shows a path oscillation example. Each of the three host pairs
has two paths, one of which is shared with the other two pairs. Each pair transfers two
elephant flows. If all of the three pairs constantly move flows to a less congested path in
synchronization, DARD causes a permanent path oscillation.
The fundamental reason for path oscillation is that different sources independently and
thus, inevitably reallocate flows off from the same overloaded path in synchronization. To
understand how serious this synchronization problem is, we present a simple analytical
model. We would like to estimate how many synchronized source and destination ToR
pairs are likely to use the same link from a core to an aggregation switch (this inter-pod
link is usually the bottleneck).
In a n-pod fattree, we use X to note the n
2
4
cores. Given a link l from a core to
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an aggregation switch, there are npn1q
2
(noted as Y ) ToRs outside of the pod that link l
connects to. And there are n
2
(noted as Z) ToRs inside of the pod that link l connects
to. Suppose every ToR randomly chooses one core as the intermediate hop to a ToR in
a different pod, the expected number of source and destination ToR pairs using link l is
Y Z
X
 n 1, which is bounded by the fattree size.
Because DARD’s distributed design choice makes it difficult to coordinate all the hosts
to completely prevent synchronized flow reallocation, we choose to introduce certain ran-
domness to eliminate synchronization. Given the above limited number of synchronized
source and destination ToR pairs on a bottleneck link, we believe simply adding random-
ness to each host’s control interval can work fairly well. Our evaluation in Chapter 2.6.3
also shows that randomizing each end host’s control interval successfully prevents path
oscillation.
Despite DARD’s simple design, it is effective. We prove in Chapter 2.4.2 that DARD
converges to a Nash equilibrium regardless of different values of δ. We also prove in
Chapter 2.4.3 that if we carefully choose δ, DARD’s gap to the optimal flow allocation is
bounded. We further discover in our evaluation that DARD’s performance is not sensitive
to the δ value.
2.4 DARD Modeling
In this section, we prove DARD can converge to a Nash equilibrium in finite steps and its
gap to the optimal flow allocation is bounded.
2.4.1 Explanation of the objective
We assume TCP is the dominant transport protocol in datacenter, which tries to achieve
max-min fairness if combined with fair queuing. Each end host moves flows from over-
loaded paths to underloaded paths to increase its observed minimum fair share. This sec-
tion explains that given a static traffic demand and max-min fair bandwidth allocation,
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the global minimum fair share is the lower bound of the global minimum flow rate, thus
increasing the minimum fair share actually increases the global minimum flow rate.
Theorem 1: Given a static traffic demand and max-min fair bandwidth allocation, the
global minimum fair share is the lower bound of global minimum flow rate.
Proof: First we define a bottleneck link according to [Boudec (2000)]. A link l is a
bottleneck for a flow f if and only if 1) l is fully utilized, and 2) flow f has the maximum
rate among all the flows using l.
A link li’s fair share Si is defined as Bi{Ni, where Bi is the link capacity and Ni is
the number of flows via li. Without loss of generality, we assume link l0 has the minimum
fair share S0. Flow f has the minimum rate, min rate. Link lf is flow f ’s bottleneck.
Theorem 1 claims min rate ¥ S0. We prove it by contradiction.
According to the bottleneck definition, min rate is the maximum flow rate on link lf ,
and thus Bf{Nf ¤min rate. Suppose min rate   S0, we get
Bf{Nf   S0 (2.2)
which is contradictory with S0 being the minimum fair share. As a result, min rate ¥ S0,
i.e., the minimum fair share is the lower bound of the global minimum flow rate.
The implication of above theorem is that by increasing each source and destimation
pair’s observed minimum fair share, both the global minimum fair share and the global
minimum flow rate increase as well.
2.4.2 Convergence proof
We now formalize DARD’s selfish flow allocation algorithm as a congestion game [Busch
and Magdon-Ismail (2009)] and prove it converges to a Nash equilibrium in finite steps.
We assign an index to each flow of the static traffic demand and use Pk to represent
the set of paths for the kth flow. A Strategy s  rp1, p2, . . . , pns is a collection of paths,
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where pk P Pk and is delivering the kth flow. Given a strategy s, we use Slpsq to note
link l’s fair share. A path p’s path congestion Cppsq is represented by the smallest link
fair share along that path. The system congestion Cpsq is the smallest link fair share in the
network. Notation sk refers to the strategy s without pk, i.e., rp1, . . . , pk1, pk 1, . . . , pns.
psk, pk1q refers to the strategy rp1, . . . , pk1, pk1 , pk 1, . . . , pns. The kth flow is locally
optimal in strategy s if for any other possible path pk1 P Pk.
Cpkpsq ¥ Cpk1 psk, pk1q (2.3)
A Nash equilibrium is a state where all flows are locally optimal. A strategy rs is global
optimal if for any strategy s, Cprsq ¥ Cpsq. We further define the price of anarchy (PoA)
as follow.
PoA  minimumsPSCpsq
Cprsq (2.4)
In other words, PoA quantifies the worst system congestion with DARD’s selfish behavior.
Theorem 2: If every source and destination pair follows Algorithm 1 and at most one
flow is relocated at any given step, then the global minimum fair share does not decrease
in every step and all the source and destination pairs converge to a Nash equilibrium in
finite steps.
Proof: A strategy s’s strategy vector svpsq is in the form of [v0,v1,v2,. . .], where vk
is the number of links with fair share between kδ and pk   1qδ. These links are referred
as a fair share equivalence class. This δ is the positive parameter in the selfish flow
allocation algorithm. As a result, this vector cluster the links into multiple equivalence
classes according to their fair share values.
°
k vk is the total number of links in the
network.
Suppose s and s1 are two strategies, svpsq  rv0,v1,v2,. . .s and svps1q  rv10,v11,v12,. . .s.
We define s  s1 if vk  v1k for all k ¥ 0. s1   s if there exists some j such that v1j   vj
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and @k   j, v1k ¤ vk. It is easy to show that given three strategies s, s1 and s2, if s2 ¤ s1
and s1 ¤ s, then s2 ¤ s.
Given a specific network, traffic pattern and δ, there are only finite numbers of strategy
vectors. According to the definition of “  ” and “   ”, we can find at least one strategy
rs that is the smallest, i.e., for any strategy s, rs ¤ s. This rs has the largest minimum fair
share or has the least number of links with the minimum fair share, and thus is the global
optimal.
If one flow selfishly changes its path and makes the strategy move from s to s1, this
action decreases the number of links with a particular fair share and increases the number
of links with a relatively larger fair share. In other words, s1   s. This indicates asyn-
chronous and selfish flow allocation does not decrease global minimum fair share in every
step until all flows reach local optimum. Since the number of strategy vectors is finite, the
steps to converge to a Nash equilibrium is finite.
Lemma 1: The global optimal strategy rs is also a Nash equilibrium strategy.
Proof: Because rs is the smallest strategy, no flow can have a further movement to de-
crease rs, i.e., every flow reaches local optimum. As a result, this global optimal strategy is
also a Nash equilibrium strategy.
In the proof of Theorem 1, one key parameter is δ, the width of a fair share equivalence
class. It makes the continuous model discrete, i.e., we treat two fair shares as the same
value if they locate in the same equivalence class. The δ value is a trade-off between a
larger global minimum fair share when the system converges and a smaller number of
convergence steps. A small δ forces a source and destination pair to explore a better flow
allocation as long as its observed most congested and least congested links are located
in different equivalence classes. On the other hand, a large δ decreases the convergence
steps by enlarging each equivalence class. One thing to note is the system is proven to
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converge to a Nash equilibrium despite the δ value.
2.4.3 Bound the price of anarchy
So far, we have proven if every source and destination pair follows DARD’s selfish strat-
egy, the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. We also proved that the optimal flow
allocation, which maximizes the global minimum fair share, is also a Nash equilibrium.
However, these two equilibriums are not necessarily the same. Next we are going to prove
that for some carefully assigned δ, we can bound the gap between DARD’s and the optimal
equilibriums.
We first assign δ according to (2.5). Cpsq represents the system congestion after DARD
converges. Bl represents link l’s capacity when l is the bottleneck for certain flows. Nl is
the number of flows on the bottleneck l. As a result, the left side of (2.5) means the width
of an equivalence class is no larger than the minimum fair share after convergence,
otherwise the system congestion remains in the same equivalence class before and after
DARD’s scheduling. The right side of (2.5) makes sure the width of an equivalence class
is larger than the maximum change of all the bottleneck links’ fair shares in the entire
convergence process, and consequently every flow reallocation causes bottleneck links
to move to no further than the adjacent equivalence classes.
Cpsq ¥ δ ¥ maximum p Bl
Nl  1 
Bl
Nl
q (2.5)
Suppose the kth flow is locally optimal with its path congestion Cpk , then according to
the definition of local optimum, every alternative path for that flow must have congestion
at most Cpk   δ, i.e., the bottlenecks of all the alternative paths are either in the same or
the adjacent equivalence class, otherwise reallocating this flow to an alternative path will
improve the flow’s path congestion.
We define a path-cut of a source and destination pair to be a set of links such that
every path connecting the pair must use at least one link from this set. A straightforward
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observation is shown in Lemma 2. We are now ready to use this lemma to bound the price
of anarchy in Theorem 3.
Lemma 2: Given a strategy s  rp1, p2, . . . , pns where the kth flow is locally optimal,
then there is a path-cut for that source and destination pair in which every link’s congestion
is at most Cpk   δ.
Theorem 3: Given a network topology with P being the longest path length, M being
the maximum number of paths between any source and destination, L being the number
of links and Bmin and Bmax being the minimum and maximum link capacities in the
topology, then the price of anarchy defined in (2.4) is bounded by Bminp logL
logpM1q
 1qpM1qBmaxP .
Proof: As shown in Theorem 2’s proof, for any non-Nash equilibrium strategy s1, there
always exists at least one Nash equilibrium strategy s, such that s   s1, i.e., we can treat
a Nash equilibrium strategy as a local optimal strategy. As a result, we can further restrict
the s in (2.4) to be any Nash equilibrium strategy.
We use Cpsq to note the system congestion of a Nash equilibrium strategy s. Let J0
be the set of links whose link congestion is Cpsq (|J0| is at least 1). Let F0 be the set of
flows that use at least one link in J0. By Lemma 2, every source and destination pair of
the flows in F0 has a path-cut in which every link’s congestion is at most Cpsq   δ. Let J1
be the union of J0 and all the above path-cuts of every flow in F0. Then we have J0 P J1
and every link in J1 has the congestion at most Cpsq   δ.
We repeat the above process as follows. Ji is the union of Ji1 and the path-cuts for
the source and destination pairs of the flows in Fi1. By Lemma 2, every link in Ji has
the congestion at most Cpsq   iδ. Then we construct flow set Fi, each of which uses at
least one link in Ji. By the above construction, we obtain a sequence of Ji and Fi, where
J0  J1 . . .  Ji and F0  F1 . . .  Fi. We stop this process until we find the first set Jk
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such that
|Jk| ¤ pM  1q|Jk1| (2.6)
where M is the maximum number of paths between any source and destination in the
topology. In the next paragraph we explain why this k must exist.
In the above process, if at themth step we find |Jm| ¤ pM1q|Jm1|, then k  m and
we stop the construction. Otherwise, noticing the congestion upper bound for all the link
sets is at most the minimum link capacity Bmin, we continue the above construction until
at the nth step this congestion upper bound reaches Bmin. Then the difference between Jn
and Jn1, noted as D, is the set of links with the congestion between Bmin  δ and Bmin,
i.e., there is only one flow via each link of D. We use FD to note the flows via D and
thus have |FD| ¤ |D|. Let M be the maximum number of paths between any source and
destination, then in the pn   1qth step, each flow in FD can contribute at most pM  1q
links to construct Jn 1, i.e., |Jn| is expanded less than pM  1q times. As a result, if
k  pn  1q, then |Jk| ¤ pM  1q|Jk1|.
So far we have shown the k satisfying (2.6) exists. Each link in Jk1 has the fair share at
most pCpsq pk1qδq. Let T be the times that links in Jk1 are used by the flows in Fk1
and Bmin be the minimum link capacity in the topology, then T ¥ BminCpsq pk1qδ |Jk1|. On
the other hand, the links in Jk1 are only used by the flows in Fk1, and suppose that the
maximum path length is P , then T ¤ P |Fk1|. As a result,
kCpsq ¥ Cpsq   pk  1qδ ¥ |Jk1|Bmin|Fk1|P (2.7)
The first “¥” is because of the left side of (2.5). Next we are going to bound the right
side of (2.7). Since Jk has a path-cut for every flow in Fk1 and thus every flow in Fk1
must use at least one link in Jk under all the possible strategies, including the optimal rs,
i.e., links in Jk are used at least |Fk1| times. According to pigeonhole principle, despite
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how flows in Fk1 are being allocated, at least one link in Jk is used at least |Fk1|{|Jk|
times. Let Bmax be the maximum link capacity in the topology, we have
Bmax
Cprsq ¥
|Fk1|
|Jk| (2.8)
By combining (2.8), (2.7) and (2.6) we get
Cpsq
Cprsq ¥
|Jk1|Bmin
k|Fk1|PCprsq
¥ |Jk1|Bmin
k|Jk|BmaxP
¥ Bmin
kpM  1qBmaxP (2.9)
We are then going to bound k in (2.9). Let L be the number of links in the topology.
Because k is the first number that satisfies (2.6), thus
L ¥ |Jk1| ¥ pM  1q|Jk2| . . . ¥ pM  1qk1|J0|
Since |J0| ¥ 1, we have
logL
logpM  1q   1 ¥ k (2.10)
By combining (2.9) and (2.10) we bound the price of anarchy in (2.11) which is only
related to the topology but not the traffic demand. It is in the order of 1
logL
.
PoA  minimumsPSCpsq
Cprsq
¥ Bminp logL
logpM1q   1qpM  1qBmaxP
(2.11)
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2.5 Implementation
To evaluate DARD’s performance and to show DARD is practically deployable, we imple-
mented a prototype and deployed it on a 4-pod fattree topology in DeterLab [Lab (2003)].
We also implemented a simulator in ns-2 to evaluate DARD’s performance in large scale.
2.5.1 Testbed
We set up a 4-pod fattree topology using 4-NIC PCs acting as the switches. Their IP
addresses are configured according to Section 2.3.3. We enable IP alias [Sironi (2001)] on
each end host to support multiple IP addresses on one NIC. All switches run OpenFlow
V1.0 on top of the standard Ubuntu 10.04 LTS image. An OpenFlow switch maintains
flow and port level statistics and allows us to customize its forwarding tables.
We implement a NOX [Gude et al. (2008)] component to configure all the flow tables
during switches initialization. This component allocates the downhill flow table to table0
and the uphill flow table to table1 to enforce a higher priority for the downhill table. All
entries are configured to be permanent. NOX is often used as a centralized controller for
OpenFlow enabled networks. However, DARD leverages NOX only once to initialize the
static flow tables. The same purpose can be achieved by other techniques.
A daemon program runs on every end host. It has the three components shown in
Figure 2.2. The elephant detector leverages the TCPTrack [Steve (2005)] at each end host
to report an elephant flow if the bytes of a TCP connection grow beyond certain threshold.
The switch monitor tracks the fair share of all the equal-cost paths connecting the source
and destination ToR switches by querying switches for their states using the interfaces of
aggregated flow statistics provided by OpenFlow [Openflow (2008)]. The flow allocator
moves elephant flows from overloaded paths to underloaded paths according to the selfish
flow allocation algorithm. We use the Linux IP-in-IP tunneling as the encapsulation and
decapsulation module. We assign every end host with an IP address from a different prefix
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as its ID. The mappings from IDs to the corresponding NIC IP addresses are kept in a file
at all end hosts.
We also implement the ECMP algorithm on every switch. It decides the next hop by
hashing the source and destination NIC IP addresses and TCP ports using CRC16 [Hopps
(2000)].
Existing VLB implementation, which randomly picks a core as the intermediate hop,
behaves equivalently to ECMP [Al-Fares et al. (2010)] and can lead to collisions at the
cores. However, if an end host periodically picks a random core as the intermediate
hop, there will be no permanent collision. As a result, we implement this periodical VLB
(pVLB) in the testbed to compare with DARD. An end host uses Linux IP-in-IP tunneling
to determine which core is the intermediate hop.
2.5.2 Simulator
To evaluate DARD in larger scale, we build a DARD simulator in ns-2, which captures
the system’s packet level behavior. This simulator supports fattree, Clos network [Green-
berg et al. (2009)] and the Cisco 3-tier topology whose oversubscription is larger than
one [Cisco Systems, Inc. (2011)]. TCP New Reno is used as the transport protocol.
We also implement the demand-estimation and simulated annealing algorithm de-
scribed in Hedera, a centralized elephant flow allocation approach, and set the control
parameters according to [Al-Fares et al. (2010)]. To fit the simulator in memory and to
speed up the simulation, we remove all the unnecessary packet headers and disable almost
all the tracing and logging functions. We use the flow allocation of Hedera’s simulated
annealing to approximate the optimal solution.
2.6 Evaluation
This section describes DARD’s evaluation on both testbed and ns-2 simulator. We focus
this evaluation on three aspects. (1) DARD does not cause path oscillation and can fastly
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converge to a state where every host pair stops reallocating flows. (2) DARD achieves
higher bisection bandwidth than ECMP and pVLB and its gap to the optimal flow alloca-
tion is small. (3) DARD introduces less control overhead than centralized flow allocation
and its overhead is bounded by the size of the topology. We conduct a fair comparison
of DARD with the industry practice (ECMP) and the solutions that are incrementally de-
ployable (pVLB and Hedera). We leave comparing DARD with MPTCP to our future
work.
2.6.1 Evaluation Settings
Traffic Patterns
Due to the absence of real datacenter traffic traces, we use the three traffic patterns in-
troduced in [Al-Fares et al. (2008)] for both our testbed and simulation evaluations. (1)
Stride, where an end host Eij sends elephant flows to the end host Ekj , i  k. This pattern
emulates the extreme case where traffic stresses out the links between the cores and the
aggregation switches. (2) Staggered(PToR,PPod), where an end host sends flows to another
end host connecting to the same ToR with the probability PToR, to any other end host in
the same pod with the probability PPod and to the end hosts in different pods with the
probability 1  PToR  PPod. In our evaluation, PToR is 0.5 and PPod is 0.3. This pattern
emulates the case where the instances of the same application are close to each other and
the most traffic is within the same pod or even under the same ToR switch. (3) Random,
where an end host sends elephant flows to any other end host with a uniform probability.
This traffic pattern emulates an average case where applications are randomly placed in
datacenters. The above three traffic patterns can be either static or dynamic. The static
traffic means all permanent elephant flows start at the same time. The dynamic traffic
refers to the elephant flows that start to transfer large files at different times.
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Parameter Settings
To ensure that the evaluation setting reflects real world datacenters as closely as possible,
we carefully choose every parameter in both the testbed and simulation evaluation. This
section enumerates all these parameters and explains how their values are assigned.
Depending on the datacenter designs, the network oversubscriptions vary a lot. The
oversubscription ratio is computed as a layer’s aggregated downstream bandwidth divided
by that layer’s aggregated upstream bandwidth. It is usually larger than one because the
higher the hierarchy is, the more expensive the device is. On the aggregation level, the
fattree and Clos network have 1-oversubscription, while the Cisco 3-tier topology has
this ratio between 1.5 and 3.6. The inter-switch link capacity of all the three topologies
is in the order of 10Gbps. Due to hardware constraints, including Deterlab’s maximum
100Mbps bandwidth and ns-2 server’s memory limitation, we scale down the above link
capacities to 100Mbps in testbed and 1Gbps in simulation but keep oversubscriptions the
same. Given the end-to-end latency in datacenters is in the order of µs, we set a link’s one
direction latency to 10µm. The switch buffer size is configured as the delay bandwidth
product.
We set the elephant flow threshold to be 100KB, because around 20% of the pro-
duction datacenter flows are larger than 100KB [Kandula et al. (2009b)]. For the static
traffic pattern, the number of elephants between a source and destination is uniformly
distributed between M and 2M , where M is the number of paths connecting the pair. We
choose this value to stretch the datacenter capacity and to ensure that every path connecting
a pair has the chance to be allocated with elephant flows. In both testbed and simulation
experiments, we set the dynamic traffic pattern’s flow size to be 128Mb for two rea-
sons. First, elephant size is usually between 100Mb and 1Gb [Kandula et al. (2009b)]. We
choose the size toward the smaller value to accelerate experiments. Second, we need to
ensure a flow finishing earlier is purely caused by a better flow allocation but not because
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of a smaller file. We will explain how we set the flow inter-arrival times on experiment
bases.
The control interval, the interval of two consecutive selfish flow allocations of the
same host pair, is set as 5 seconds plus a random time in r0s, 5ss. Because the majority of
elephant flows last for more than 10s [Kandula et al. (2009b)], our control interval setting
is small enough to prevent a flow from being delivered even without getting the chance to
be reallocated, and on the other hand, it is big enough to limit the reallocation frequency.
It also matches Hedera’s 5s control interval [Al-Fares et al. (2010)]. To conduct a fair
comparison, we also set each end host in pVLB to randomly pick a core as the intermediate
hop every 10 seconds. Since an end host in DARD does not need the latest network states
until the next round of selfish flow allocation, we can set the query interval, the interval
between two consecutive sets of queries for switch states sent by the same host, to be 5s
which is the lower bound of the above control interval. However, to ensure an end host
receives the latest switch states, we add a safe margin and set this query interval to be
2.5s, i.e., at least two sets of responses are received by the end host before the next round
of selfish flow allocation.
Last but not least, we intend to choose a right value for δ in the selfish flow allocation
algorithm. We have proven that DARD converges to a Nash equilibrium despite the δ value
in Chapter 2.4.2. We also bound the gap between DARD’s and the optimal equilibriums
if δ satisfies (2.5) in Chapter 2.4.3. However, we cannot obtain either side of (2.5) until
the system converges. As a result, we treat δ as a variable in our evaluation and vary it
from 1Mbps to 10Mbps to evaluate how sensitive is DARD to different δ values. We
consider this range reasonable because the number of concurrent flows going in and out
of a host is almost no more than 100 [Greenberg et al. (2009)]. Assuming a pessimistic
scenario where every end host concurrently sends 100 elephants, each link in a fattree
topology will approximately delivers 100 elephants. Given the 1Gbps link capacity in our
simulation, a link’s fair share is 1Gbps
100
 10Mbps. We choose this value as the δ according
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to (2.5). By intuition, the smaller the δ is, the larger fair share DARD will achieve when
it converges. To verify this intuition we further choose two smaller δ values, 1Mbps and
5Mbps, in our simulation. We only let δ be 10Mbps in our testbed evaluation to accelerate
the experiment and to reduce the log file size on every switch and end host.
2.6.2 Testbed Results
The purpose of the testbed evaluation is to prove that DARD is readily deployable and can
outperform the practical state of the art, including ECMP and pVLB, the improved version
of VLB, under both static and dynamic traffic patterns.
We design the first set of testbed experiments to demonstrate a working DARD system.
We inject random static traffic in the testbed. Each elephant flow is a long-lived TCP
connection. We constantly log each elephant flow’s rate and the time stamp when a flow
gets reallocated. We obtain the bisection bandwidth by aggregating the incoming flow
rates at all the end hosts.
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FIGURE 2.5: This figure demonstrates how DARD works from traffic injection to system
convergence under random static traffic on the testbed. The dash line with cross in Fig-
ure 2.5(a) shows DARD increases the minimum flow rate over time. The other three lines
in Figure 2.5(a) shows DARD achieves higher bisection bandwidth compared with ECMP
and pVLB. Figure 2.5(b) shows 98% of the flows get reallocated less than once before the
system converges.
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As shown in Figure 2.5(a), DARD achieves 15% higher bisection bandwidth than
ECMP and pVLB by reallocating flows to less congested paths. pVLB’s bisection band-
width have more fluctuation than ECMP, which implies that pVLB may just migrate a hot
spot instead of eliminating hot spots. The dash line with plus shows that DARD increases
the minimum flow rate by offloading flows from overloaded paths. We can also tell from
Figure 2.5(a) that DARD converges to a stable state around 15s, which is approximately
2 control intervals. Figure 2.5(b) shows each elephant gets reallocated for only limited
times: 90% of the flows are not reallocated in their life-cycles, 8% are reallocated once.
The remaining 2% are reallocated to less congested paths only twice.
In our second set of testbed experiments, we repeat the same measurement but under
different static traffic patterns. The experiment lasts for one minute. We use the results
from the middle 40 seconds to calculate the average bisection bandwidth. Figure 2.6
shows the result: DARD outperforms both ECMP and pVLB. We also observe that the
bisection bandwidth gap between DARD and the other two approaches increases in the
order of staggered, random and stride. It is because the flows via the core have more
path diversities than the flows inside a pod. Compared with ECMP and pVLB, DARD
strategically reaches a better flow allocation than simply relying on randomness.
In the third set of testbed experiments, we evaluate DARD under dynamic traffic. We
stretch the capacity of the network by increasing the number of elephant flows between
every source and destination and compare DARD and ECMP’s flow finish times. We vary
the flow generating rate of each host pair from 1 to 10 per second. The experiment lasts
five minutes. We track the start and the end time of every flow and calculate the average
finish times for both DARD and ECMP. We then calculate the time improvement using
formula (2.12), where TECMP is the average file transfer time with ECMP, and TDARD is
the average file transfer time with DARD.
improvement  TECMP  TDARD
TECMP
(2.12)
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FIGURE 2.6: This figure compares DARD, ECMP and pVLB’s average bisection band-
widths under different static traffic patterns on the testbed. The more path diversities, the
larger bisection bandwidth DARD achieves.
Figure 2.7 shows DARD’s average improvement over ECMP vs. the flow generating
rate under different traffic patterns. For the stride pattern, DARD outperforms ECMP
because it reallocates flows from overloaded paths to underloaded paths and increases
the minimum flow rate in every round. We find random and staggered traffic share an
interesting pattern: When the flow generating rate is low, ECMP and DARD have almost
the same performance because the bandwidth is over-provided. As the flow generating rate
increases, cross-pod flows congest the switch-to-switch links, where DARD can reallocate
the flows off the bottleneck and improve the file transfer time. When the flow generating
rate becomes even higher, the links between hosts and switches are congested by flows
within the same pod and become the bottlenecks, which cannot be bypassed by any flow
allocation algorithm. The comparison of DARD and pVLB follows the same pattern.
In our last set of testbed evaluations, we enhance the previous experiment by using
dynamic traffic of different inter-arrival times to mimic the reality. Because the inter-
arrival times of all the flows follow a periodic pattern spaced by 15ms and around 20% of
all the flows are elephants [Kandula et al. (2009b)], we set a new elephant flow to start at
an end host every 75ms. Figure 2.8 shows DARD improves the medium file transfer time
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FIGURE 2.7: This figure shows DARD’s improvement of file transfer time compared with
ECMP under dynamic traffic patterns on the testbed.
by pushing both the maximum and minimum toward the medium. The implication is that
DARD improves bisection bandwidth and fairness under real datacenter traffic patterns.
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FIGURE 2.8: This figure shows ECMP, pVLB and DARD’s maximum, medium and
minimum file transfer times under dynamic traffic patterns. DARD reduces the file transfer
time by pushing both the maximum and minimum toward the medium.
2.6.3 Simulation Results
One advantage of simulation is that we can evaluate DARD in different topologies and in
much larger scale. We also compare DARD with Hedera, a centralized elephant allocation
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approach, in the ns-2 simulation.
Path Oscillation and Convergence Speed
Adaptive routing may lead to path oscillation because flows are synchronously allocated to
underloaded paths [Khanna and Zinky (1989)]. Our first set of simulation is to show that
DARD does not cause path oscillation and can quickly converge to a stable state, where
every host pair stops reallocating flows.
We start from showing the existence of path oscillation if we do not randomize the
control interval. We disable the randomization by setting all control intervals to be 5s and
conservatively set the δ of the selfish flow allocation algorithm to be 1Mbps. Then we
inject dynamic random traffic pattern on a 128-host fattree (consisting of 8-port switches).
Since the core’s outgoing links are usually the bottleneck for inter-pod elephant flows [Al-
Fares et al. (2010)], we track the utilizations at the core. Figure 2.9 shows the utilizations
on the eight outgoing links of the first core. After the initial oscillation due to flow re-
allocations, the utilizations stabilize afterward. However we cannot simply conclude that
DARD does not cause any path oscillation, because the above link utilizations cannot il-
lustrate a single flow’s behavior. As a result, we further log every flow’s path changes and
find out that even after the the utilizations stabilize, certain flows are constantly reallocated
between two paths, e.g., one elephant flow is reallocated between two paths 23 times in its
life cycle. This indicates path oscillation exists without randomization.
We address the above path oscillation by adding a random time between 0s and 5s to
the control interval. We conduct the same experiment as Figure 2.9 under dynamic traffic
patterns. Figure 2.10 shows the CDF of how many times flows are reallocated in their life
cycles. 86% of the staggered flows stick to their original paths because of the limited path
diversities within the same pod. Almost all of the stride flows get reallocated for only less
than four times even though they are across pods and have the most path diversities. These
small numbers of flow reallocations indicate DARD is stable after randomization.
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FIGURE 2.9: This figure shows the outgoing link utilizations of the first core under dy-
namic random traffic pattern. These utilizations stabilize after the initial oscillation even
without control interval randomization. However this figure does not reflect a single flow’s
behavior.
We have proven (Chapter 2.4.2) and shown that DARD can converge to a Nash equi-
librium. However, if the convergence takes a significant amount of time, the network will
be underutilized during this process. As a result, we also measure how fast DARD can
converge to the Nash equilibrium. We use the static traffic pattern on a fattree with 1024
hosts. We start all the elephant flows simultaneously and track the time each host pair
stops reallocating flows. Figure 2.11 shows the CDF of the above times. DARD converges
in less than 25s for almost all the host pairs. Given a control interval at each end host is
roughly 10s, the entire system converges in less than three control intervals. DARD has
the fastest convergence speed under staggered traffic, because its dominant intra-pod flows
have less path diversities.
Figure 2.10 and 2.11 have shown when δ  1Mbps, DARD does not cause path os-
cillation and almost all of the host pairs can converge to a stable state within two to three
control intervals. We also conduct the same experiments when δ is assigned with 5Mbps
and 10Mbps. Figure 2.12 shows the 90-percentile of the times a flow gets reallocated
given different δ values. We analyze this figure in two aspects. First, given the same δ
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FIGURE 2.10: This figure shows the CDF of flow reallocations during their life cycles
after control interval randomization. For all the dynamic traffic patterns, more than 90%
of flows get reallocated less than 4 times.
value, stride traffic causes the most flow reallocations because inter-pod traffic has more
path diversities. It is also consistent with the observation in Figure 2.10. Second, given
the same traffic pattern, each host pair in DARD takes less steps to converge when δ in-
creases. This is because larger δ makes DARD less sensitive to the fair share difference
that is smaller than δ, in which case host pairs quickly stop reallocating flows.
Impact of Topologies, Traffic Patterns and δ Values
We prove DARD converges to a Nash equilibrium despite the δ values (Chapter 2.4.2).
We also prove that if we carefully choose this δ, the gap between DARD’s and the optimal
flow allocation is bounded (Chapter 2.4.3). In our second set of ns-2 evaluation, we are
going to enhance the above theories by showing DARD’s two advantages despite differ-
ent topologies and traffic patterns. First, the bisection bandwidth achieved by DARD is
close to that achieved by centralized flow allocation. Second, different δ values do not
significantly impact DARD’s performance.
We conduct our simulations on three topologies: 1024-host fattree, 1024-host Clos
network [Greenberg et al. (2009)] and 1024-host 3-tier Cisco topology [Cisco Systems,
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FIGURE 2.11: This figure shows the CDF vs. the time when a host pair stops reallocating
flows. Every host pair stops reallocating flows within 3 control intervals under three static
traffic patterns.
Inc. (2011)]. The fattree and Clos topologies all have 1-oversubscription, but the Cisco
topology has 1.5-oversubscription on the aggregation level. We inject three static traffic
patterns on these topologies and measure the bisection bandwidth by constantly aggre-
gating the receiving rate of every end host. For the same topology, the same traffic pattern,
we compare six approaches of flow allocation: Hedera, ECMP, pVLB and DARD with
δ  1Mbps, 5Mbps and 10Mbps. For the same setting, we conduct the experiment ten
times. As a result, we conduct 33610  540 simulations in total. Every experiment
lasts for five ns-2 minutes. We average the bisection bandwidth from the last four ns-2
minutes for analysis. We consider Hedera as the close-to-optimal solution and use Hed-
era’s bisection bandwidth to normalize the bisection bandwidth of the other approaches
under the same topology and the same traffic pattern. As a result, Hedera’s normalized
bisection bandwidth is always 1. Figure 2.13 shows the normalized bisection bandwidth
of different flow allocation approaches. We analyze this figure from three aspects.
First, we consider the impact of different traffic patterns under the same topology.
For the fattree topology, DARD always outperforms ECMP and pVLB. The bisection
bandwidth gap between DARD and these two approaches increases when inter-pod traffic
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FIGURE 2.12: This figure shows the 90-percentile of the times a flow gets reallocated
given different δ values and different traffic patterns. The error bar shows the 80-percentile
and 100-percentile. Stride traffic introduces the most flow reallocations due to its dominant
inter-pod flows. DARD converges faster when δ increases from 1Mbps to 10Mbps.
becomes dominant. This result matches our testbed evaluation in Figure 2.6. Another
observation is that under the staggered traffic, where intra-pod traffic is the dominant,
DARD outperforms Hedera by around 20%. This is because Hedera only reallocates the
flows going through the cores and it degrades to ECMP when most of the traffic is intra-
pod [Al-Fares et al. (2010)]. On the other hand, under the stride traffic, where inter-pod
traffic is dominant, Hedera achieves larger bisection bandwidth than DARD, but the gap
between DARD and Hedera is less than 25%. We have the same observation under both
the Clos network and Cisco topologies.
Second, we consider the impact of different topologies under the same traffic pattern.
Both fattree and the Clos network have 1-oversubscription. Cisco topology, on the other
hand, has 1.5-oversubscription on the aggregation level. This causes the Cisco topology
to be more likely bottlenecked between the aggregation switches and the cores. As a
result, under the stride traffic, where inter-pod traffic is the dominant, Hedera has the
best performance on the Cisco topology. ECMP and pVLB reach only 30% of Hedera’s
bisection bandwidth. This number for DARD is between 60% and 70%. The implication
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FIGURE 2.13: This figure compares the maximum, medium and minimum bisection
bandwidth of different flow allocation approaches. For the same topology and traffic pat-
tern, we use Hedera’s bisection bandwidth to normalize the bisection bandwidth of the
other approaches. DARD outperforms both ECMP and pVLB under all circumstances.
It also outperforms Hedera when intra-pod traffic is dominant. When inter-pod traffic is
dominant, DARD’s gap to Hedera is small. Larger δ can slightly decrease DARD’s bisec-
tion bandwidth.
is that as the state of the art industry practice, hashing-based randomness is not efficient
for allocating elephant flows on oversubscribed networks.
In the last aspect, we consider the impact of different δ values. Given the same topol-
ogy and the same traffic pattern, we observe that the larger δ is, the smaller DARD’s
bisection bandwidth is. We will explain the reason in detail in Chapter 2.4.3 and only
provide the intuition here: A small δ makes a source and destination pair sensitive to the
differences in flow rates and thus, forces the pair to explore better flow allocations as long
as the maximum difference is beyond this δ. In this set of experiments, we increase δ by
10 times (from 1Mbps to 10Mbps), the bisection bandwidth achieved by DARD decreases
by at most 20%, which implies that different δ values do not significantly impact DARD’s
performance.
Control Overhead
In our last set of simulations, we compare DARD and Hedera’s control overhead. DARD’s
control traffic is mainly caused by periodical polling, including both switch state queries
and switch state replies. Hedera’s control traffic consists of three parts: controller’s queries
to the ToRs for the elephants, ToRs’ replies and the flow entry update messages from the
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controller to all the switches. DARD’s control traffic is not related to δ because it is the
query interval that determines how often an end host sends out queries to switches. As a
result, δ is set to 1Mbps for all the experiments. We trace the control traffic of both DARD
and Hedera on a 128-host fattree under a static random traffic pattern. We also increase
the number of elephants between all the source and destination pairs to measure how the
control overhead would change with the traffic load. Figure 2.14 shows the maximum
bandwidth taken by the control traffic vs. the peak number of elephants in the topology.
We analyze this figure from two aspects.
We initially compute the bandwidth taken by the control messages by averaging all the
control traffic every 30 seconds. As shown in Figure 2.14, we divide the x-axis into three
stages. In the first stage, DARD’s control messages take less bandwidth than Hedera’s,
mainly because of DARD’s smaller message size (48 or 32 bytes for DARD but 80 or
72 Bytes for Hedera). In the second stage, DARD’s control messages take slightly more
bandwidth. That is because one new elephant flow introduces potentially more control
messages in DARD than in Hedera. In an extreme example, when migrating a flow, Hedera
only needs to insert entries along the new path and delete the entries along the old path. On
the other hand, the source host in DARD has to query the switches along all the possible
paths. In the third stage, DARD’s polling traffic is eventually bounded by the topology
size. However, Hedera’s overhead increases proportionally to the number of elephants.
Since a large computation period may mask short-lived spikes, we conduct the same
computation every 5 seconds. The result is also shown in Figure 2.14. The curve for
DARD does not change much because each end host’s individual behavior smooths out the
spikes. On the other hand, the maximum bandwidth cost by Hedera increases significantly
(as much as 3 times in the worst case). The implication is that centralized flow allocation
introduces considerable temporal control overhead. If some forwarding entries are not
updated simultaneously, Hedera falls back to ECMP.
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FIGURE 2.14: This figure shows the comparison of DARD and Hedera’s control over-
head. DARD’s control traffic is bounded by the topology size and does not increase with
the number of elephants. However, Hedera’s control traffic is approximately proportional
to the number of elephants. Hedera leads to larger control traffic when we choose a smaller
computation interval, which indicates that Hedera introduces control traffic spikes.
2.7 Summary
This chapter has proposed DARD, a readily deployable distributed routing architecture
for datacenter networks. It is reliable, capable of improving bisection bandwidth, scalable
and debugging-friendly. DARD allows each end host to selfishly reallocate elephant flows
from overloaded paths to underloaded paths. Our analysis shows that DARD converges
to a Nash equilibrium in finite steps and DARD’s gap to the optimal flow allocation is
bounded in the order of 1
logL
with L being the number of links. Testbed deployment and
ns-2 simulation indicate that the above gap is small in practice and that DARD introduces
small control overhead.
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3MPXCP: Explicit Multipath Congestion Control
Protocol
3.1 Introduction
In the past decade, the Internet has undergone two fundamental evolvements: on the one
hand, the explosive demand for deploying data-intensive services in cloud has driven the
datacenter network to upgrade to 10Gbps and 40Gbps link capacities. In addition, to
fulfill the capacity demand, modern datacenters are designed to have multiple paths con-
necting any host pair. This design enlarges the end-to-end capacity by tens of times. On
the other hand, the world-wide demand for mobile computing has connected mobile de-
vices to the Internet seamlessly via both WIFI and LTE, even airline flights have provided
wireless connections. Both evolutions lead to a consequence of increasingly larger delay-
bandwidth product.
However, TCP, the dominant transport protocol, has significantly limited the capabil-
ity of the underlying infrastructures. First, TCP is sensitive to packet reordering. Con-
sequently, almost all the practical multipath routing protocols [Wu and Yang (2012); Al-
Fares et al. (2010)] are allocating traffic in the granularity of a TCP connection. Without
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the capability of stripping one TCP connection into multiple paths, collisions and subop-
timal flow allocations may significantly harm the aggregated throughput [Al-Fares et al.
(2010)]. Second, with the increase of the delay-bandwidth product in both datacenter and
wireless networks, TCP becomes oscillatory and prone to instability [Katabi et al. (2002)].
To eliminate the first limitation, multipath TCP (MPTCP) [Wischik et al. (2011)] has
been proposed to upgrade the transport layer to support multiple paths rather than relying
on complex routing protocols. Instead of carefully allocating every single TCP connection,
MPTCP views the multiple paths as a resource pool and tries to efficiently and fairly utilize
it by extending TCP’s AIMD concept. Intensive evaluations have shown that MPTCP can
efficiently and fairly utilize network bottlenecks [Raiciu et al. (2011, 2012)].
However, to the best of our knowledge, MPTCP focuses on capacity allocation and
sequence number management. It does not address TCP’s limitation under increasing
delay-bandwidth product. We summarize MPTCP’s performance degradation due to large
delay-bandwidth product into four aspects: slow convergence, inefficiency, being biased
against long-RTT flows and large queue size. Chapter 3.2 explains them in detail. The
key insight is: MPTCP and the legacy TCP share common design principle and technique
details. As a result, they suffer form similar degradation when the delay-bandwidth pro-
duction increases. This degradation can even be resolved by similar solutions.
In this chapter, we choose to tackle the four performance degradations from two per-
spectives. On the one hand, we leverage MPTCP’s congestion control law to efficiently
and fairly utilize the multiple paths connecting a host pair. On the other hand, we use
explicit congestion feedback to accelerate the convergence [Katabi et al. (2002)]. We refer
to this transport protocol as Explicit Multipath Congestion Control Protocol (MPXCP).
We carefully design MPXCP such that switches do not have to maintain per-flow state,
and thus MPXCP can scale up to arbitrary numbers of flows. Our intensive simulation
shows that MPXCP can address all the four MPTCP’s degradations despite different delay-
bandwidth products.
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To the best of our knowledge, MPXCP is the first explicit multipath congestion control
protocol. Our contributions are:
1. We discover four MPTCP performance degradations: slow convergence, inefficiency,
being biased against long-RTT flows and large queue size.
2. We design MPXCP to efficiently and fairly utilize network capacity despite its delay
and bandwidth.
3. We implement MPXCP in ns-2. Intensive simulation shows that MPXCP outper-
forms MPTCP despite different delay-bandwidth products.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 3.2 reviews the design ratio-
nale of MPTCP and its degradation under large delay-bandwidth product. We introduce
MPXCP’s design detail in Chapter 3.3. Chapter 3.5 explains MPXCP’s stateless imple-
mentation. Chapter 3.6 describes our intensive ns-2 evaluation. We also explore other
design considerations extended from MPXCP’s control logic in Chapter 3.7. Chapter 3.8
discusses related work and Chapter 3.9 summarizes this chapter.
3.2 MPTCP Summary
3.2.1 MPTCP’s Congestion Control
Multipath TCP [Wischik et al. (2011)] considers the multiple paths connecting a host pair
as a resource pool. Once the source puts the traffic of one connection along all the paths,
MPTCP ensures efficiency and fairness. We use flow to refer to a MPTCP connection.
One flow consists of multiple sub-flows, each of which uses a path.
The major complexity of MPTCP’s congestion control is from the flappiness of cou-
pled congestion control and the RTT mismatch of different paths [Wischik et al. (2011)].
To intuitively explain how MPTCP address these challenges, we assume different paths
share the same RTT. We use ws to denote the congestion window along path s and wf 
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sPf ws to denote the aggregated congestion window of flow f . Then MPTCP extends
TCP’s AIMD as follows.
1. AI: in one RTT, increase ws by wswf of a packet and thus increase wf by one packet.
2. MD: decrease ws by ws2 after a loss on path s.
The above congestion control law puts more traffic on less congested paths and meanwhile,
keeps sufficient probe traffic along congested paths [Wischik et al. (2011)].
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FIGURE 3.1: This figure shows the fence topology, a mimic of the TCP dumbbell topol-
ogy. n host pairs are connected via four 1Gbps bottlenecks. Each bottleneck has a drop tail
queue with the size of the delay-bandwidth product. Each host pair’s RTT is experiment
specific.
3.2.2 MPTCP’s Degradations
If we consider the multiple paths connecting a host pair as one conceptual path, MPTCP’s
congestion control is exactly TCP’s AIMD. As a result, we suspect that MPTCP and TCP
may suffer from similar problems. To justify our concern, we use MPTCP’s ns-2 imple-
mentation [Nishida (2010)] and conduct four experiments on the fence topology shown in
Figure 3.1.
In our first simulation, we use five host pairs and assign their RTTs to be 1ms. The
kth host pair starts an MPTCP flow using all the four bottlenecks at the time second 20k.
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FIGURE 3.2: This figure shows MPTCP’s slow convergence to fairness. Five host pairs
in the fence topology start one flow every 20 seconds. Even though the bottlenecks are
efficiently utilized, the bandwidth allocation is not fair.
Figure 3.2 shows each flow’s throughput over time. Even though the aggregated through-
put reaches the bottleneck capacity, the time to converge to fairness is long. For example,
flow1 and flow2 do not reach fairness after flow2 has been injected for 20 seconds. The
negative impact of slow convergence is that the network may be inefficiently and unfairly
utilized during convergence.
In our second simulation, we enlarge the bottleneck bandwidth from 1Gbps to 100Gbps
but keep the same 1ms RTT. This setting is to mimic a datacenter network that has large
bandwidth but small latency. As shown by the plus curve in Figure 3.4(a), with the increase
of the capacity, the bottleneck becomes less utilized. For example, when the bottleneck
increases to 100Gbps, its utilization drops to 85%. That is because MPTCP’s slow AI
takes a considerable amount of RTTs to ramp up the large bandwidth.
In our third simulation, we use 30 host pairs and assign different RTTs to each pair
from 1ms to 30ms. The plus curve in Figure 3.8 shows that MPTCP is biased against
flows with longer RTTs. We use an analytic model to explain the reason. Suppose all the
paths share the same negligible loss rate p and the same RTT. In the equilibrium of a host
pair, the ACK rate times the window increase per ACK should be equal to the packet drop
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rate times the window decrease per drop, i.e., Equation (3.1).
wsp1 pq
RTT
 1
wf
ws
wf
 wsp
RTT
 ws
2
(3.1)
Then we get wf 
a
2p1 pq{p  a2{p and ratef  a2{p{RTT , which means
each flow’s rate is inversely proportional to its RTT.
In our last simulation, we let the bottleneck bandwidth be 1Gbps and all the RTTs be
1ms. We start 30 MPTCP flows simultaneously. The dotted line in Figure 3.3 shows the
aggregated queue length, normalized by the delay-bandwidth product, over time. Once the
queue is ramped up by MPTCP, it never drains.
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FIGURE 3.3: This figure shows the normalized queue size in the bottlenecks over time.
MPTCP quickly ramps up the bottleneck queue and does not drain.
In sum, we observe that MPTCP shares the same degradations as TCP under large
delay-bandwidth product, including: slow convergence, inefficiency, being biased against
long-RTT flows and large queue size.
3.3 Protocol Design
3.3.1 Explore the Design Space
Ideally, we would like to find the solution to simultaneously address all MPTCP’s per-
formance degradations. In this section, we explore all the possible solutions for each
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degradation. The root cause for MPTCP’s slow convergence and inefficiency under large
delay-bandwidth product is that the additive increase phase costs too many RTTs to ramp
up the large bandwidth. A natural way to address these problems is to apply explicit con-
gestion control [Katabi et al. (2002)], in which switches inform the end host explicitly
how to set the congestion window. Like TCP, MPTCP is also biased against flows with
long RTTs. There are two ways to address this problem: fair queuing [Bennett and Zhang
(1996)] and explicit congestion control [Katabi et al. (2002)]. Last but not least, to main-
tain a small queue size, active queue management (AQM) [Floyd and Jacobson (1993)]
and explicit congestion control [Katabi et al. (2002)] are two obvious choices. In sum,
even though fair queuing and AQM can address part of the four MPTCP performance
degradations, explicit congestion control has the potential to simultaneously address all of
them. As a result, we choose explicit congestion control as our solution.
3.3.2 Explicit Congestion Control
In this section we assume a pure MPXCP network. MPXCP is a window-based congestion
control protocol. It leverages both ECN and multipath to achieve efficiency and fairness.
Each flow f consists of a set of sub-flows, each of which may take a different path. Each
sub-flow smaintains its own congestion window cwnds and its own round trip timeRTTs.
A flow f maintains its aggregated congestion window according to Equation (3.2).
cwndf 
¸
sPf
cwnds. (3.2)
The sender informs the switches with its congestion windows via a congestion header in
every packet. The switch monitors the bandwidth, queue size and traffic load and tags each
packet with the expected changes in each sender’s congestion window. A more congested
switch can further update this tag. The receiver simply echoes the tag to the sender. The
sender then updates its congestion windows accordingly. MPXCP achieves the same band-
width allocation as MPTCP but with fewer round trips. A simplified congestion window
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control law is described as follows.
1. AI: in one RTT, increasews by ∆ws, where ∆ws9ws{wf and
°
∆ws  spare bandwidth.
2. MD: decrease ws by ∆ws, where ∆ws9ws and
°
∆ws  queue size.
In the above description, AI tries to grab the available bandwidth in one RTT and the
MD tries to drain the queue in one RTT. Note that it is a highly simplified design for easy
understanding. We now start to describe the design details.
3.3.3 The Congestion Header
Each MPXCP packet contains a congestion header as shown in Table 3.1. The cwnds is
the sender sub-flow s’s congestion window. The RTTs is sub-flow s’s RTT estimation.
The cwndf is flow f ’s aggregated congestion window using Equation (3.2). These fields
are initialized by the sender and never changed by the switches. The last field feedbacks
is initialized to be infinite by the sender. Switches on the path update this field to explicitly
control the sub-flow’s congestion window. A positive/negative value implies the sender
needs to increase/decrease the sub-flow’s congestion window accordingly.
cwnds(sender sub-flow’s cwnd)
RTTs (sender sub-flow’s RTT estimation)
cwndf (sender’s aggregated cwnd)
feedbacks(initialized to 8)
Table 3.1: MPXCP’s congestion header.
3.3.4 The MPXCP Sender and Receiver
On packet departure, the sender encapsulates the packet with a congestion header and
sets RTTs to be the corresponding round trip time estimation and cwndf to be the flow’s
aggregated congestion window size. The source greedily fills infinite to the feedbacks
field to request window increase. When an acknowledge arrives, the sender increases the
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corresponding sub-flow’s congestion window according to Equation (3.3), where sizes is
the sub-flow’s packet size.
cwnds  maxpcwnds   feedbacks, sizesq (3.3)
Even though packet losses caused by congestion are rare for MPXCP, packet losses
due to interference are common in wireless networks. MPXCP responds to packet losses
the same way as MPTCP but keeps the congestion window unchanged. In this way, packet
loss is no longer an indirect signal for congestion. Congestion window is adjusted purely
by the explicit congestion control.
When acknowledging a packet, the MPXCP receiver copies the congestion header
from the data packet to its acknowledgement packet.
3.3.5 The MPXCP Router
A switch maintains a per link control interval estimation d. A longer control interval leads
to a stagnated reaction to congestions, while a shorter control interval leads to proactive
reaction to congestions even without observing the effects of the previous adjustment. As
discussed in XCP [Katabi et al. (2002)], we choose the average round trip time on a link
as that link’s control interval.
MPXCP separates efficiency controller from fairness controller. Thus, the rule of fairly
allocating capacity among flows and the rule of fully utilizing capacity are independent.
Efficiency Controller
The purpose of the efficiency controller is to maximize link utilization and to minimize
persistent queue size. We use Equation (3.4) to refer to the aggregated feedback in a
control interval d. α and β are the two constants as suggested in XCP. We prove in the
appendix that XCP’s α and β setting can also stabilize MPXCP despite arbitrary average
RTTs. S is the spare bandwidth defined as the differences between the link capacity and
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the input traffic rate. Q is the smallest queue size seen in a control interval.
φ  α  d  S  β Q (3.4)
Equation (3.4) makes the feedback within one average RTT proportional to the spare band-
width when the link is not fully utilized, or proportional to the queue size when packets
are buffered. MPXCP achieves efficiency by dividing the above aggregated feedback to
every packet’s feedbacks field.
Fairness Controller
The fairness controller is to allocate the above aggregated feedback to individual packets
to achieve fairness. MPXCP uses MPTCP’s control rationale to converge to fairness [Wis-
chik et al. (2011)], i.e., Aggregated-Additive-Increase and Per-Subflow-Multiplicative-
Decrease. Following is how to compute per packet feedback. (1) If φ ¡ 0, a switch
allocates feedback to each packet such that the throughput increases for all the flows are
the same. (2) Meanwhile, the above increase of each flow is distributed among the cor-
responding sub-flows proportionally to each sub-flow’s throughput. The intuition is that
MPXCP always prefers less congested paths and also keeps sufficient probe traffic on
more congested paths such that the sender can quickly react to congestion variations. (3) If
φ   0, a switch allocates feedback to each packet such that the decrease in the throughput
of a sub-flow is proportional to its current throughput. This feedback allocation strategy
ensures MPXCP converges to MPTCP fairness when φ is not zero.
However, when efficiency becomes optimal, i.e., φ  0, the above convergence process
stops. As a result, we also introduce bandwidth shuffling as XCP [Katabi et al. (2002)] to
ensure that in every control interval, at least a minimum amount of bandwidth is always
reallocated. This approach ensures that the efficiency is not affected while the throughput
of different flows converges to fairness. Equation (3.5) shows how to compute the shuffle
traffic on each link, in which y is the link’s input traffic in a control interval d. γ is set to
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0.1 as XCP, which is a tradeoff between convergence speed and the fluctuation around the
optimal efficiency.
h  maxp0, γy  |φ|q (3.5)
Per packet feedback consists of a positive feedback p and a negative feedback n, as
shown in Equation (3.6), where the index s represents the a sub-flow.
feedbacks  ps  ns (3.6)
Equation (3.7) represents how to compute per packet positive feedback ps. Sub-flow s
belongs to flow f . Symbol ∆ represents the increase/decrease of a value. Cp is a positive
constant. This allocation ensures (1) all flows increase the same amount of throughput
in each control interval and (2) a flow’s aggregated positive feedback is allocated to each
sub-flows proportionally to their throughput. By doing so, each sender allocates most of
its traffic to less congested paths while keeping sufficient probe traffic on other paths.
ps 
∆cwnds
# of packets
 p∆tputs RTTsq{p
cwnds
sizes RTTs
 dq
 ∆tputs 
sizes RTT
2
s
cwnds  d
 pCp 
cwnds
cwndf
q 
sizes RTT
2
s
cwnds  d
 Cp 
sizes RTT
2
s
cwndf  d
(3.7)
Because the link throughput increased in one control interval is h maxpφ,0q
d
, we have
¸
all pkts
ps
RTTs

h maxpφ, 0q
d (3.8)
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Plug (3.7) into (3.8), we get
Cp  ph maxpφ, 0qq{
¸ sizes RTTs
cwndf
(3.9)
The per packet negative feedback is proportional to the corresponding sub-flow’s through-
put, as shown in Equation (3.10), where Cn is a negative constant.
ns 
∆cwnds
# of packets
 p∆tputs RTTsq{p
cwnds
sizes RTTs
 dq
 ∆tputs 
sizes RTT
2
s
cwnds  d
 pCn  cwndsq 
sizes RTT
2
s
cwnds  d
 Cn 
sizes RTT
2
s
d
(3.10)
Because the link throughput decreased in one control interval is h maxpφ,0q
d
, we have
¸
all pkts
ns
RTTs

h maxpφ, 0q
d (3.11)
Plug (3.10) into (3.11), we get
Cn  ph maxpφ, 0qq{
¸
sizes RTTs (3.12)
Each router will update Cp and Cn at the end of every control interval. On every packet
departure, the router will compute and update the per packet feedback according to (3.7)
and (3.10) using the latest Cp and Cn. One thing to note is that even cwnds is not directly
used in the above computation, though we still keep it in the congestion header to compute
per sub-flow’s average RTT (chapter 3.5).
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3.4 Stability Analysis
This proof is similar to Katabi et al. (2002). We claim no credit for it. Consider a fence
topology as shown in Figure 3.1, in which n MPXCP host pairs are sending flows via m
paths. Let d be the common RTT of all host pairs. We use yptq to denote the aggregated
throughput along one bottleneck at time t and qptq to denote that bottleneck’s queue size at
time t. According to Equation (3.4), we use the following differential equations to model
the bottleneck congestion control.
q1ptq  yptq  c
y1ptq  1
d2
pα  d  pc ypt dqq  β  qpt dqq
We define xptq  yptq c, K1  αd and K2  βd2 . The above differential equations can
be transformed to:
q1ptq  xptq
x1ptq  K1  pypt dq  cq K2  qpt dq
As a result, the open loop transfer function is:
Gpsq  K1s K2
s2
eds (3.13)
The magnitude and angle are:
|Gpsq| 
a
K21ω
2  K22
ω2
(3.14)
=G  pi   arctanK1ω
K2
 ωd (3.15)
We follow the same logic as Katabi et al. (2002) to simplify the parameter setting,
i.e., setting both break frequency and crossover frequency to be K2
K1
. Thus, when plugging
w  K2
K1
into Equation (3.14), |Gpsq|  1; we get β  ?2α2.
59
To ensure a stable close loop system, we need =Gpwcq  pi   pi4  βα ¡ pi. As
a result β
α
  pi
4
. Combined with the result from last paragraph, we have α   pi
4
?
2
and
β  ?2α2. Under this setting, the close loop system is stable despite the delay, capacity
and the number of host pairs.
3.5 Implementation
We implement MPXCP in ns-2. The sequence number management is based on MPTCP’s
ns-2 repository [Nishida (2010)]. Different from MPTCP, MPXCP’s congestion control
logic on the host side is trivial. Thus, we focus on the router implementation. The highlight
is that routers do not have to maintain per flow state to achieve efficiency and fairness.
A MPXCP enabled router requires three pieces of code to update per packet feedback.
Algorithm 2 is executed when a packet arrives. The router reads every congestion header
and accumulates certain intermediate variables for the next computation of Cp and Cn.
Algorithm 3 is executed at the end of every control interval (avg rtt). A router updates
Cp and Cn and resets the timer. The aggregated positive and negative feedbacks for the
next control interval are stored in residue pos fbk and residue neg fbk.
Algorithm 4 is executed at every packet departure to update the feedbacks field. The
residue pos fbk and residue neg fbk ensure that the aggregated positive and negative
feedbacks are bounded in this control interval.
Algorithm 2: On packet arrival
1: sum size rtt by cwndf += psizes  rttsq{cwndf ;
2: sum size rtt += sizes  rtts;
3: sum size += sizes;
4: sum cwnds by rtt += cwnds{rtts;
5: sum cwnds += cwnds;
60
Algorithm 3: On control interval timeout
1: avg rtt = sum cwnds{sum cwnds by rtt;
2: φ = αpavg rtt capacity  sum sizeq  βQueue;
3: shuffle = max(0, 0.1  sum size |φ| );
4: residue pos fbk = shuffle  maxpφ, 0q;
5: residue neg fbk = shuffle  maxpφ, 0q;
6: Cp = residue pos fbk{sum size rtt by cwndf ;
7: Cn = residue neg fbk{sum size rtt;
8: sum size rtt by cwndf = 0;
9: sum size rtt = 0;
10: sum size = 0;
11: sum cwnds by rtt = 0;
12: sum cwnds = 0;
Algorithm 4: On packet departure
1: ps= pCp  sizes  rtt2q{pcwndf  avg rttq;
2: ns= pCn  sizes  rtt2q{avg rtt;
3: feedback = ps  ns;
4: if feedbacks ¥ feedback then
5: feedbacks = feedback;
6: residue pos fbk -= ps;
7: residue neg fbk -= ns;
8: else if feedbacks ¥ 0 or feedback ¥ 0 then
9: residue pos fbk -= feedbacks;
10: residue neg fbk -= pfeedback  feedbacksq;
11: else
12: residue neg fbk += feedbacks;
13: end if
14: Cp  presidue pos fbk ¤ 0q ? 0 : Cp;
15: Cn  presidue neg fbk ¤ 0q ? 0 : Cn;
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we use intensive ns-2 simulation to show that MPXCP can simultaneously
address all the four MPTCP’s degradations discussed in Chapter 3.2. Our MPXCP’s im-
plementation is built on top of MPTCP’s ns-2 implementation from the IETF Multipath
TCP working group [Nishida (2010)]. We keep the sequence number management mech-
anism and modify the congestion control logic as described in Chapter 3.5.
3.6.1 Simulation Setup
We use the topology shown in Figure 3.1 for most of the simulations. We vary the number
of bottlenecks, number of host pairs, bottleneck capacities and host pair RTTs in a series
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of experiments to compare MPXCP and MPTCP. We use drop tail queue and set the queue
length to be the delay-bandwidth product for all the experiments. We set α  0.4 and
β  0.226 according to [Katabi et al. (2002)].
3.6.2 Higher Utilization and Smaller Queue
In this section, we will show that MPXCP achieves higher utilization and smaller queue
size despite the link capacity, RTT, and the number of concurrent flows.
Impact of Capacity. We first enlarge the bottleneck capacity from 1Gbps to 100Gbps
but keep the 1ms round trip time. This setting is to mimic a datacenter network that
has large capacity but small latency. We inject 50 flows in both directions of the fence
topology to stress the backward capacity, such that the ACKs can be lost. We compute
the bottleneck utilizations in the forward direction. As shown in Figure 3.4(a), MPTCP
cannot efficiently utilize the bottleneck when the bottleneck capacity increases. The reason
is because MPTCP’s additive increase takes a significant amount of round trips to ramp up
the bottleneck. However, MPXCP’s bottleneck utilization is close to 100%. The y-axis of
Figure 3.4(b) is the queue size normalized by the delay-bandwidth product. It shows that
MPXCP maintains a negligible queue while MPTCP keeps a queue size of more than 40%
of the delay-bandwidth product.
Impact of Latency. We then keep the 1Gbps bottleneck capacity but vary the end-to-
end latency from 6ms to 600ms. Figure 3.5 shows the result. MPXCP can efficiently uti-
lize the bottleneck capacity while MPTCP’s utilization decreases mainly because a packet
loss can easily cause timeout. Figure 3.5(b) shows that MPXCP maintains a negligible
queue size. Another notable observation is that MPTCP’s frequent timeout drains the bot-
tleneck queue.
Impact of Number of Flows. We also stretch MPXCP by increasing the number of
concurrent flows. To accelerate the simulation process, we set each bottleneck link to be
100Mbps. Each host pair’s round trip time is 6ms. Figure 3.6(a) shows that both MPTCP
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FIGURE 3.4: This figure shows the medium bottleneck utilization and queue size vs. the
bottleneck capacity. MPXCP efficiently utilizes the bottleneck with negligible queue size
despite the bottleneck capacity.
and MPXCP can efficiently utilize the bottleneck despite the number of concurrent flows.
However, Figure 3.6(b) shows that only MPXCP maintains a negligible queue size. One
thing to note is that when the number of concurrent flows reaches 100, i.e., each MPXCP
sender is stressed by maintaining a 3-packet aggregated congestion window along 4 paths,
MPXCP can still efficiently utilize the bottleneck and keeps a negligible queue size.
3.6.3 MPXCP Improves Fairness
In this section, we are going to show MPXCP improves fairness despite different round
trip times.
Fairness of Same-RTT Flows. We first set each bottleneck capacity to be 1Gbps and
set all the RTTs to be 1ms. We increase the concurrent number of flows from 1 to 30. For
each number, we conduct the experiment for 200 seconds and use the flow rate from the
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FIGURE 3.5: This figure shows the medium bottleneck utilization and queue length vs.
RTT. MPXCP efficiently utilizes the bottleneck with negligible queue size despite the
round trip time.
middle 180s to compute the Jain’s fairness index [Chiu and Jain (1989)]. Figure 3.7 shows
the medium fairness index vs. the number of concurrent flows. The error bars represent
the maximum and the minimum. All MPXCP’s mediums and error bars overlaps at value
1, while MPTCP’s index varies significantly. This result implies that MPXCP is fair to the
same-RTT flows despite their concurrent number.
Fairness of Different-RTT Flows. We then vary each flow’s RTT according to its
index: the kth flow’s RTT is k milliseconds. We inject 30 flows in total. Figure 3.8 shows
that MPTCP is biased against long-RTT flows. Contrarily, MPXCP can evenly allocate the
same amount of capacity to all the flows. The reason is because MPXCP allocates traffic
in the granularity of a flow, i.e., cwnd
RTT
.
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FIGURE 3.6: This figure shows the medium bottleneck utilization and queue length vs.
the number of concurrent flows. MPXCP efficiently utilizes the bottleneck capacity with
negligible queue length.
3.6.4 MPXCP Improves Convergence Speed
In this section, we will illustrate MPXCP’s fast convergence.
Quick Convergence to Fairness. We first conduct the same experiment as Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.9 shows that every time when a new flow is injected, MPXCP efficiently and
fairly reallocates the bottleneck capacity in one round trip.
Robustness to Bursty Traffic. We also evaluate MPXCP’s convergence speed under
bursty traffic. We inject one long-lived flow in the fence topology at time 0s. At time 4s
and 8s we suddenly start and stop 29 other flows. Figure 3.10 shows how the bottleneck
utilization and Jain’s fairness index change over time. Both MPXCP and MPTCP can
efficiently utilize the bottleneck capacity, but only MPXCP achieves fairness.
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FIGURE 3.7: This figure shows Jain’s fairness index vs. number of concurrent flows. All
host pairs have 1ms RTT and all start at time 0s. The fairness index is computed every 0.5
second from 10s to 100s. Each plus/cross represents the medium. The error bars represent
the maximum and minimum. MPXCP reaches the perfect fairness.
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FIGURE 3.8: This figure shows each flow’s throughput vs. its RTT. The kth host pair’s
RTT is kms. There are 30 host pairs in total. MPXCP is fair to all flows despite different
RTTs because MPXCP allocates the bottleneck capacity in the granularity of a flow.
3.6.5 MPXCP Prevents Incast
In this section, we will show that because MPTCP still builds up queues, incast [Chen
et al. (2009)] becomes inevitable. However, MPXCP can constantly drain the queue and
prevent incast.
Figure 3.11(a) shows a typical topology under a top-of-rack switch in datacenters. The
bottleneck capacity is 1Gbps. The end-to-end RTT is 1ms. We use the same workload
described in [Chen et al. (2009)] to conduct this experiment, i.e., the client requests 100
256-byte blocks of data from n servers. We vary this n from 1 to 16. Each block is striped
across n servers. The client does not request block k   1 until all the fragments of block
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FIGURE 3.9: This figure has the same setting as Figure 3.2 but using MPXCP. It quickly
converges to fairness in one RTT.
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FIGURE 3.10: This figure shows that MPXCP is more robust to bursty traffic than
MPTCP. One long-lived MPXCP flow is fully utilizing the bottlenecks in the fence topol-
ogy. At 4s, 29 short-lived flows are injected and the long-lived flow’s throughput de-
creases to 1
30
. At 8s, the 29 short-lived flows stop and the long-lived flow quickly grabs
all the available capacity. Figure 3.10(a) shows the long-lived flow’s throughput and the
aggregated throughput of the 29 short-lived flows. Figure 3.10(b) shows the Jain’s fairness
index of all the 30 flows from 4s to 8s.
k have been received. This workload results in a constantly synchronized read pattern,
builds up the bottleneck queue and causes packet losses.
Figure 3.12(a) shows the aggregated goodput vs. the number of servers given either
MPTCP or MPXCP as the transport protocol. The goodput is measured at the client by
dividing the sum of received unique packets over the transmission time. Because MPTCP
degrades to TCP in this topology, goodput collapse still happens when there are more than
2 servers. However, MPXCP does not cause incast due to its negligible queue size.
We further expand the topology in Figure 3.11(a) to the multipath topology in Fig-
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FIGURE 3.11: This figure shows the incast experiment settings. Figure 3.11(a) represents
the topology under a top-of-rack switch. Figure 3.11(b) represents multihomed servers
under multiple top-of-rack switches [Raiciu et al. (2011)]. In both topologies, one receiver
requests data blocks from multiple senders. All RTTs are 1ms.
ure 3.11(b). This is also the topology proposed by the MPTCP community to improve
MPTCP’s performance [Raiciu et al. (2011)]. In this topology, each host is multihomed
to m top-of-rack switches. In our evaluation, we assign m with either 2 or 4 (as shown in
Figure 3.12(b)’s legend). MPTCP postpones the goodput collapse simply due to a larger
aggregated bottleneck capacity. On the contrary, MPXCP prevents incast by constantly
draining the queue.
3.6.6 Resilience to Network Dynamics
In this section, we will show that MPXCP is resilient to network dynamics, including
packet losses and link failures [Wu et al. (2012)].
Resilience to Packet Loss. We inject 50 long-lived flows in the fence topology and
increase the packet loss rate on the bottlenecks from 0 to 1%. Figure 3.13 shows the
bottleneck utilization vs. the loss rate. MPXCP can still efficiently utilize the bottleneck
capacity when the loss rate is 1%. This is because packet losses due to non-congestion
reasons do not reduce the sender’s congestion window.
Resilience to Link Failures. We then show that NetPilot can quickly react to link
failures and recoveries. We assume an end host can seamlessly detect path availability
and retransmit lost packets along a different path. How to fulfill these two assumptions is
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FIGURE 3.12: This figure shows how MPXCP prevents Incast. We follow the same set-
ting as the distributed storage system [Chen et al. (2009)]. Figure 3.12(a) shows that the
goodput achieved by MPXCP is almost the same as the bottleneck capacity. Figure 3.12(b)
shows that if we expand the original topology (Figure 3.11(a)) into its multipath version
(Figure 3.11(b)), MPTCP postpones the goodput collapse due to larger aggregated bottle-
neck capacity. On the contrary, MPXCP’s goodput is close to the bottleneck capacity.
beyond this thesis. We inject four continuous flows in the fence topology and disconnect
three bottleneck links at 2s, 4s, and 6s respectively. At 8s, 10s, and 12s we reconnect the
failed links one by one. Figure 3.14 shows each flow’s throughput vs. time. As we can
see, MPXCP can quickly achieve efficiency and fairness after link failures and recoveries.
3.6.7 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we will analyze if MPXCP is sensitive to configurable parameters. As
discussed in Chapter 3.3, MPXCP has three parameters: α and β from Equation (3.4) and
γ from Equation (3.5). Given the first two parameters are computed according to control
theory (Appendix), we only explore how sensitive is MPXCP to different γs. γ ensures
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FIGURE 3.13: This figure shows MPXCP is more robust to packet losses than MPTCP.
We inject 50 long-lived flows in the fence topology and increase the bottleneck loss rate
from 0 to 1%. The plus/cross represents the medium bottleneck utilization from time 1s
to 20s. The error bars represent the minimum and maximum. MPXCP achieves larger
throughput because non-congestion packet losses do not reduce the sender’s congestion
window.
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FIGURE 3.14: This figure shows MPXCP is robust to link failures. Four flows are travers-
ing the fence topology. Three of the bottleneck links fail at 2s, 4s, and 6s respectively.
The four flows always efficiently and fairly share the remaining bottlenecks. The failed
bottlenecks are recovered at 8s, 10s, and 12s respectively. MPXCP share the recovered
bottlenecks quickly and fairly.
that MPXCP’s convergence to fairness does not stall, i.e., when Equation (3.4) is close to 0
(the bottlenecks are efficiently utilized), Certain amount of capacity can still be reallocated
among different flows. We start two long-lived flows in the fence topology at 0s and 1s
respectively and measure the Jain’s fairness index of the two flows between 1s and 9s.
Figure 3.15 shows that as long as γ is larger than 0, MPXCP can converge to efficiency
and fairness.
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FIGURE 3.15: This figure shows that shuffle in Equation (3.5) is necessary for fairness.
However, MPXCP is not sensitive to this value. We start two long-lived flows in the
fence topology at 0s and 1s respectively and vary the shuffle parameter γ from 0 to 1.
Figure 3.15(a) shows the medium, minimum and maximum of Jain’s fairness index of the
two flows between 1s and 10s. Figure 3.15(b) shows that when γ  0, the two flows can
not reach fairness. Both figures indicate that MPXCP can achieve fairness as long as the
shuffle percentage is positive.
3.7 QoS and Deadline Awareness
MPXCP’s explicit congestion control philosophy provides a flexible framework for de-
signing a variety of capacity allocation strategies. The high-level approach is to assign
different flows with different weights. Meanwhile, because we make every effort to keep
routers stateless, MPXCP is a lightweight and scalable capacity allocation solution. We
use two examples to show MPXCP’s flexibility.
3.7.1 Quality of Service
Allocating bottleneck capacity proportionally to the price paid by each host pair is a desir-
able property [Popa et al. (2012)]. To achieve this, we change only the first control logic
in Aggregated-Additive-Increase (Chapter 3.3.5) as follows: If φ ¡ 0, a switch allocates
feedback to each packet such that the throughput increases for each flow is proportional
to its price. This logic can be easily implemented by replacing the cwndf field in the
congestion header with cwndf
pricei
, where pricei is the price paid by si.
We use simulation to show that the above simple modification can allocate bottleneck
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capacity to each flow proportionally to its price. Three flows are traversing the fence
topology with prices of 1, 2, and 3. All of the flows start at 0s. Between 0s and 5s, each
flow’s throughput is proportional to its price. After 3-price flow stops at 5s, the rest flows
efficiently utilize the bottleneck and 2-price flow takes 2
3
of the capacity. When 2-price
flow stops at 10s, the remaining 1-price flow grabs all the bottleneck capacity. Another
observation is that MPXCP is highly responsive to flow dynamics and converges in a few
RTTs every time the traffic pattern changes.
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FIGURE 3.16: This figure shows MPXCP can provide different services by ensuring
users’ throughputs proportional to their prices. We inject three flows in the fence topology.
The 3-price flow lasts from 0s to 5s. 2-price flow lasts from 0s to 10s. 3-price flow lasts
from 0s to 5s. The more expensive the price is, the larger throughput the flow gets.
3.7.2 Deadline Awareness
MPXCP is not designed to meet flow deadlines. However, MPXCP’s explicit congestion
control provides us with the flexibility to assign higher prices to the flows with tight dead-
lines. By doing so, MPXCP can indirectly prioritize flows and thus catch more deadlines.
Besides, compared with other deadline-aware protocols [Hong et al. (2012)], MPXCP
does not maintain any flow state along the path and thus significantly simplifies the over-
head of switch upgrading. We use one example to show MPXCP’s potential to catch tight
deadlines.
We inject 30 500KB flows into the fence topology. Twenty of them have the deadline
of 25ms. These flows are referred as type A. The remaining ten flows have the deadline of
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50ms, which are referred as type B. If we use the original MPXCP to fairly allocate the
capacity, each flow has the throughput of 4Gbps
30
 0.13Gbps and finishes at time 500KB
0.13Gbps

30ms. Type A flows miss their deadlines. Instead, if we assign each flow with the price
of size
deadline
, i.e., assigning A flows with the price of 500KB
25ms
and assigning B flows with the
price of 500KB
50ms
, then an A flow’s throughput is twice as much as a B flow. After delivering
all the A flows within 25ms, the remaining B flows grab all the capacity and are delivered
at 30ms. We meet all deadlines.
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FIGURE 3.17: This figure shows that by assigning larger weights to deadline-constrained
flows, MPXCP can reduce the fraction of missed deadlines. There are 30 500KB flows. 20
of them have the deadline of 25ms and 10 of them have the deadline of 50ms. As shown
in Figure 3.17(a), if all the 30 flows fairly share the bottleneck, all the 25ms-constrained
flows miss their deadlines. However, as shown in Figure 3.17(b), if we assign each flow
with the price of size
deadline
, all the 30 flows meet their deadlines.
3.8 Related Work
XCP [Katabi et al. (2002)] considers efficiency and fairness as two independent aspects of
congestion control. MPXCP follows the same philosophy. Furthermore, MPXCP needs
to carefully allocate the aggregated feedbacks among multiple sub-flows. MPXCP chose
to send more traffic along less congested paths and keep sufficient probing traffic along
congested paths.
Another directly related work is TeXCP [Kandula et al. (2005b)]. It also extends XCP’s
control logic into multipath topology. However, because it focuses on intra-domain traffic
engineering, the traffic demand is not elastic. This fundamentally different assumption
makes TeXCP’s congestion control law not applicable to multipath transport protocols.
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3.9 Summary
We design and implement Explicit Multipath Congestion Control Protocol (MPXCP) for
both datacenter networks and multi-homed wireless devices. MPXCP outperforms mul-
tipath TCP in four aspects: faster convergence, better efficiency despite different delay-
bandwidth products, better fairness despite different RTTs, and negligible queue size.
MPXCP is resilient to network dynamics. Its stateless implementation supports multiple
bandwidth allocation policies.
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4NetPilot: Automating Failure Mitigation in
Datacenter Networks
4.1 Introduction
The growing demand for always-on and rapid-response online services has driven datacen-
ter networks (DCNs) to an enormous size, often comprising tens of thousands of servers,
links, switches, and routers. To reduce capital expenses and increase overall system re-
liability, datacenter (DC) designers are increasingly building their networks using broad
layers of many inexpensive commodity hardwares instead of large chassis switches. How-
ever, as the number of devices grows, the failure of network devices becomes the norm
rather than the exception.
Diagnosing and repairing DCN failures in a timely manner has become one of the most
challenging DC management tasks. Traditionally, network operators follow a three-step
procedure to react to network failures: 1) detection; 2) diagnosis; and 3) repair. Diagno-
sis and repair are often time-consuming because the sources of failures vary widely, from
faulty hardware components to software bugs to configuration errors. Operators must sift
through many possibilities just to narrow down potential root causes. Even though auto-
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mated tools exist to help localize a failure to a set of suspected components [Bahl et al.
(2007); Kompella, R.R and Yates, Jennifer, and Greenberg, Albert and Snoeren, Alex
(2005)], operators still have to manually diagnose the root cause and repair the failure.
These diagnosis and repair sometimes require third-party device vendors’ assistance, fur-
ther lengthening the failure recovery time. Because of the above challenges, it can take a
long time to recover from disruptive failures even in well-managed networks. For instance,
in April 2011, a failure in Amazon’s AWS service impaired the operations of many cloud
services for hours [Amazon (2011)].
Realizing the problem above, we take a fundamentally different approach to tackle
the failure recovery problem in large-scale DCNs. Specifically, we advocate a four-step
process to react to failures: 1) detection; 2) mitigation; 3) diagnosis; and 4) repair. We
argue that it is more important to mitigate failures than to fix them in real-time. Here
“mitigate” means taking action(s) that alleviate the symptoms of a failure, possibly at the
cost of temporarily reducing spare bandwidth or redundancy. Timely and effective failure
mitigation enables a DCN to operate continuously even in the presence of failures, and
allows operators to dive directly into failure diagnosis and repair.
This chapter presents NetPilot, an automated system that adopts our four-step process
to quickly mitigate failures in a large-scale DCN before operators diagnose and repair the
root cause. NetPilot can significantly shorten the failure disruption time by mitigating
failures without human intervention. It can also improve online user experience and lower
potential revenue losses that stem from service downtime. Moreover, it can lower a DC’s
operational costs, as it reduces the number of emergent failures and the number of midnight
calls to on-call operators.
A key observation that motivates NetPilot’s design is that simple actions such as de-
activation or restart, coupled with the redundancy that exists in a DCN (Chapter 4.2), can
effectively mitigate most types of failures in a DCN. DCNs often have extra links and
switches to accommodate peak traffic load and device failures. In many cases, simple ac-
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tions such as deactivating or restarting an offending component can mitigate failures with
little impact on the network’s normal functions. This observation differentiates NetPilot’s
design from conventional failure diagnosis and repair approaches, which require detailed
failure-specific knowledge.
Since NetPilot has mitigation as its end goal, it can operate without human interven-
tion and without knowing the precise failure root cause. NetPilot automatically mitigates
failures in DCNs through a trial-and-error approach. First, it detects a failure and identifies
the set of suspected faulty components. Then, it intelligently iterates through the suspected
devices and applies mitigation actions on them one by one, until it mitigates the failure or
has exhausted all possible actions.
Realizing NetPilot requires overcoming two key technical challenges. First, when
mitigation actions are applied blindly, they can actually further compromise the health of
the network, e.g., deactivating a switch may overload other switches during peak hours.
NetPilot avoids this problem by employing an Impact Estimator to accurately predict the
impact of mitigation actions and executing the actions within a pre-defined safety margin.
Second, although NetPilot can safely try numerous mitigation actions before success-
fully mitigating a failure, an excessive number of trials will unnecessarily lengthen the
failure mitigation process. NetPilot addresses this challenge with an optimized mitigation
planner that uses failure-specific information to localize a failure to the most likely faulty
components, and orders the sequence of mitigation actions according to their potential
benefits.
To the best of our knowledge, NetPilot is the first automated failure mitigation system
for DCNs. Our contributions are:
• We study and classify the high-impact failures in production DCNs over a six-month
period, and find that we can mitigate most of those failures by simple actions such
as restart or deactivation. We also find that there is sufficient redundancy in a DCN
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to accommodate the impact of mitigation actions (Chapter 4.2, 4.3).
• We design and implement NetPilot (Chapter 4.4, 4.5) and deploy it in a testbed that
resembles a real DCN topology. We also conduct simulations using data from a
production DCN to evaluate NetPilot at a large scale. We experimentally validate
the accuracy of the Impact Estimator, and find that it offers an error rate of less than
8%
• We use NetPilot to automatically mitigate three types of high-impact failures that
operators often encounter in production DCNs. Besides reducing operational over-
head, NetPilot decreases the median mitigation time from 2 hours to 20 minutes
compared to current operational practice, significantly shortening a failure’s impact
on online services.
• We justify the design choices made in NetPilot. Compared to simple heuristics,
NetPilot can succeed with fewer trials while maintaining safe operating conditions
in the network.
4.2 Redundancy in Datacenter Networks
NetPilot’s design is motivated by the observation that modern DCNs have a significant
amount of redundancies at the device level, protocol level, and application level. NetPilot
takes advantage of these redundancies to automatically mitigate failures.
A DCN design must support tens of thousands of servers with high bandwidth and at
low cost. Solutions have already converged to one design paradigm: using many inexpen-
sive commodity devices to scale up capacity and to reduce cost while deploying various
types of redundancy to combat unreliability [Hoelzle and Barroso (2009)]. We describe
three redundancy types below.
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FIGURE 4.1: An example scale-out DCN topology.
4.2.1 Device-Level Redundancy
A typical modern DCN design uses a scale-out topology to create multiple redundant paths
between host pairs. Scale-out topologies such as a Fat-Tree [Al-Fares et al. (2008)] and
Clos [Dally and Towles (2003)] can achieve full bi-section bandwidth using commodity
switches that often have low port density.
Figure 4.1 shows an example scale-out topology. This topology has three layers: top-
of-rack (ToR), aggregation (AGG), and core (CORE). A container is a management unit
and also a replicable building block sharing the same power and management infrastruc-
ture. A CORE switch connects to multiple containers. For ease of exposition, we use ToR,
AGG, and CORE to refer to a switch at the ToR, aggregation, or core layer, respectively.
This scale-out topology provides multiple paths between any two servers. Such path
diversity makes the network resilient to single link, switch failure. For example, in Fig-
ure 4.1, deactivating a single link or device, with the exception of a ToR, will not partition
the network. Even a failed ToR will isolate only a small number of servers connected to it.
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4.2.2 Protocol-Level Redundancy
DCNs also use various protocols to meet traffic demands under failure conditions. There
are three practical technologies providing load balancing and fast failover at the link,
switch, and path levels. These technologies are widely available in commodity switches.
Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) abstracts multiple physical links into
one logical link and transparently provides high aggregate bandwidth and fast failover at
the link level. We use Link Aggregation Group (LAG) to refer to the above logical link.
LACP provides load balancing by multiplexing packets to physical links by hashing packet
headers. Some LACP implementations allow a LAG to start from one switch but to end at
multiple switches.
Virtual switch is a logical switch composed of multiple physical switches. A network
can use a virtual switch at the link or the network layer to mask the failures of physical
switches.
A virtual switch tolerates faults at the network layer through an active/standby config-
uration. One switch is designated as the primary while the standby switch remains silent
until it detects that the primary has failed. Two common implementations of network
layer virtual switches are the virtual redundancy router protocol (VRRP) [S. Nadas, Er-
icsson (2010)] and hot standby router protocol (HSRP) [T. Li, B. Cole, P. Morton, D. Li
(1998)]. Both VRRP and HSRP can be configured to provide load balancing.
A virtual switch at the link layer allows the physical switches to simultaneously for-
ward traffic. Generically called Multi-Chassis LAG (MC-LAG), Virtual Port Channel
(VPC) [vpc (2012)] and Split Multi-link Trunking [IEEE (2000)] are two common imple-
mentations.
Full-mesh COREs refer to the full-mesh interconnections between COREs and con-
tainers, i.e., every container connects to every core switch [Niranjan Mysore et al. (2009);
Greenberg et al. (2009)]. The ECMP [Hopps (2000)] routing protocols in full-mesh-
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COREs topologies provide load balancing and fast failover for traffic between containers.
4.2.3 Application-Level Redundancy
Modern DCNs also deploy application-level redundancy for fault tolerance. A common
technique to increase failure resilience at the application level is to distribute applications
under multiple ToRs. Therefore, deactivating any switch including a ToR is unlikely to
have more than an ephemeral impact on the applications.
Table 4.1: This table categorizes the high-impact failures in several production DCNs over
a six-month period. All failures listed here are either visible to users or impact revenue [Wu
et al. (2012)].
Category Detection Mitigation Repair Percentage
software 21% link layer loop deactivate port update software 19%
imbalance triggered overload restart switch 2%
hardware 18% FCS error deactivate port replace cable 13%
unstable power deactivate switch repair power 5%
unknown 23%
switch stops forwarding restart switch n/a 9%
imbalance triggered overload restart switch 7%
lost configuration restart switch 5%
high CPU utilization restart switch 2%
configuration 38% errors on multiple switches n/a update configuration 32%
errors on one switch deactivate switch update configuration 6%
4.3 Redundancy Warrants
Automated Failure Mitigation
In this section, we analyze and classify the failure records in a six-month period from
several production DCNs (DCNsp). We then show that most failures are easy to detect, but
difficult to diagnose or repair. However, we can mitigate them using simple actions such
as deactivation or restart.
We obtained six months of failure records for DCNsp, all of which were manually cre-
ated by operators and contain detailed descriptions of critical failures. Network operators
consider a failure critical if it is either visible to users or impacts revenue. Therefore each
record represents a failure that required immediate investigation and response. The fields
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of interest from these records are: the data sources used to detect the failure, the techniques
used to mitigate the failure, the final actions taken to repair the failure, and the start and
end times.
Table 4.1 classifies DCNsp’s critical failures. We find that the single largest source
of failures are misconfigurations. Prior research made similar findings in other contexts,
such as ISP networks [Shaikh et al. (2002)]. Misconfigurations are common in DCNs due
to the inherent complexity in managing configuration files in large-scale networks. Many
of these misconfigurations, e.g., incorrect ACL (Access Control List) rules, lead to lack
of connectivity between certain hosts. Host-to-host pings can detect these misconfigura-
tions, but fixing them is challenging and usually requires operators to manually debug the
problems.
The next common type of failure is device software failures. One such example is a
malfunctioning hash function that results in uneven link utilization among the physical
links in a LAG. In some situations, the uneven utilization is so severe that one of the phys-
ical links becomes overloaded and discards packets. We can detect this type of failure by
comparing the utilization of each link in the LAG. While we can detect software failures,
diagnosing their root causes is generally nontrivial since operators know little about the
inner workings of device binary code. Even for device vendors who have the source code,
debugging the software is still challenging because failures cannot be easily reproduced in
lab environments.
The third category of failures is hardware failures. Such failures occur frequently due
to the large number of devices used in DCNsp. For example, 13% of the failures are
caused by a single problem, frame checksum (FCS) errors, which often significantly ele-
vates host-to-host latencies. Like other failures, FCS errors can be detected by checking
switch SNMP counters, i.e., checking the number of corrupted frames received on each
port. However, pinpointing the sources of FCS errors takes time because corrupted frames
propagate throughout the network due to cut-through switching (§4.4.3). Even after iden-
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FIGURE 4.2: This figure shows the CDFs of how long it takes for DCNsp’s operators to
mitigate and to repair critical failures.
tifying the correct source, operators have to manually replace the corrupted cable.
The last category is failures whose sources are unknown. In some failures, switches
have high CPU utilization while their traffic load is low. In other cases, switches may
suddenly cease to forward traffic. These failures often cause abnormally high latency or
packet losses. Due to the intermittent and unpredictable nature of these failures, they are
difficult to reproduce, diagnose, and repair.
4.3.1 Time-Consuming Failure Recovery
From studying the types of failures in DCNsp, we see that completely repairing a fail-
ure may require debugging of code, software update, or hardware replacement. Further,
this process may also involve multiple parties: network operators, software developers,
hardware engineers, and external vendors. It is therefore difficult to automate. Figure 4.2
shows the CDFs of failure mitigation and repair times in DCNsp. As can be seen, the
failure repair times can exceed several days or even weeks.
4.3.2 Simple Mitigation Actions are Effective
Table 4.1 shows that simple actions such as deactivating or restarting a switch or port
can mitigate most types of failures in DCNsp before the root cause can be repaired. For
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example, in the case of FCS errors, operators reduce latency by deactivating the corrupted
links. In the case of overload triggered by load imbalance, operators restore load balance
by restarting the offending switches.
In fact, operators of DCNsp already take manual mitigation actions to restore a network
to a functioning state while diagnosing and repairing the failure. NetPilot’s design goal
of automating failure mitigation is partly motivated by the difficulty of manual mitigation.
We compare the manual failure mitigation time with the repair time in Figure 4.2. As can
be seen, the time it takes to mitigate failures (even manually) is much shorter than that to
repair them. The median failure mitigation time is about two hours.
We note that not all failures can be mitigated by simple actions. Certain failures, e.g.,
a global configuration error such as a misconfigured ACL, would require a network-wide
reconfiguration to fix, and thus cannot be mitigated by restarting or deactivating a few
offending devices. How to automatically mitigate those failures is beyond the scope of
this paper.
4.3.3 Spare Capacity for Mitigation Actions
From the analysis above, we find that simple actions are highly effective in mitigating
failures and also lead themselves to automation. An automated failure mitigation system
can significantly reduce failure mitigation time, as well as the burden on operators.
However, one might be concerned that these simple mitigation actions may overload
the network. To find out whether a DCN would have sufficient capacity for failure mitiga-
tion, we use the maximum link utilization after deactivating a component to measure the
amount of spare network capacity. We use the Impact Estimator to carry out this compu-
tation. (We will describe Impact Estimator in detail in Chapter 4.4.2.)
We perform this computation using the traffic matrices aggregated over 10-minute in-
tervals in one month for DCNp, a single DCN in DCNsp. Figure 4.3 shows the fraction
of time intervals during which deactivating a link, a LAG, or a switch will not cause the
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FIGURE 4.3: This figure shows the fraction of time intervals during which deactivating
a link, a LAG, or a switch will not cause the maximum link utilization to exceed a target
threshold (90%) versus the fraction of components for which this result holds.
maximum link utilization to exceed a target threshold (which is 90%) set by DCNsp’s
operators and the fraction of components for which this holds. As can be seen, 99% of
the links can be deactivated in over 90% of the intervals without overshooting the target
threshold. These numbers are slightly lower for LAGs and switches, because a LAG or a
switch contains multiple links. Overall, there is sufficient redundancy in DCNp to tolerate
a component deactivation most of the time.
4.4 NetPilot Design
NetPilot quickly mitigates failures without knowing their actual root causes in four steps.
The first step (S1) is failure detection, in which it constantly monitors the network and
detects any potential failure. The second step (S2) is mitigation planning. When NetPilot
detects a failure, it will propose a set of suspected components, determine the appropriate
mitigation actions, and order these actions based on the likelihood of success or potential
impact. The third step (S3) is impact estimation. To avoid taking any action that would
further degrade network health, NetPilot estimates the impact of each action and discards
the actions that are considered unsafe. The last step (S4) is plan execution. NetPilot will
successively execute each mitigation action. If an action successfully mitigates the failure,
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NetPilot marks the failure as mitigated. Otherwise, NetPilot will roll back the action and
try the next action.
In this section, we focus on two main technical challenges: impact estimation (S3) and
mitigation planning (S2). We postpone the discussion of failure detection (S1) and plan
execution (S4) to the next section. Note that impact estimation must be accurate in order
for NetPilot to avoid actions that could further degrade network health. However, NetPilot
can work properly even without precisely localizing a failure or ordering the mitigation
actions.
4.4.1 Impact Metrics
A chief design goal for NetPilot is to avoid taking any mitigation action that could further
degrade a DCN’s health. Typically, for a given traffic matrix over a time interval T , we
can assess a DCN’s health via three metrics: availability, packet losses and end-to-end
latency. The availability and packet losses of a DCN can be quantified by the fraction
of servers with network connectivity to the Internet (online server ratio) and the total
number of lost packets (total lost pkt) during the interval T respectively. Quantifying
latency is tricky because it is difficult to predict how intra-DC network latency would
change after a mitigation action. Given this problem, we use the maximum link utilization
(max link util) across all links during the interval T as an indirect measure of network
latency. Because the propagation delay is small in a DCN (no more than a few millisec-
onds), low link utilization implies small queuing delay and thus low network latency. Next,
we will explain how to predict these metrics after a mitigation action.
4.4.2 Estimating Impact
The Impact Estimator aims to estimate a mitigation action’s impact on a DCN. Answering
this question is crucial for ensuring the safety of mitigation actions. The Impact Estimator
takes an actionA and a traffic matrix TM as two input variables and computes the expected
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impact of A under TM . Since it is straightforward to compute online server ratio given
a network topology, we focus on estimating max link util and total lost pkt in the rest
of the discussion.
We can get the max link util and total lost pkt by collecting SNMP counters in a
DCN. However, predicting these two metrics after a mitigation action is nontrivial be-
cause the action could change the traffic distribution in the network. In a DCN with no
centralized routing control, we cannot precisely predict how packets are routed to their
destinations, unless we know all the packet headers, forwarding tables, and load balancing
hash functions.
Our approach to address this challenge is based on two important facts that shape the
traffic distribution in DCNs. First, there are far more flows than the diversity of paths in
DCNs [Greenberg et al. (2009); Kandula et al. (2009b)]. Second, hash-based flow-level
load balancing is widely used at the link level, switch level, and path level in production
DCNs [Hopps (2000); Greenberg et al. (2009)].
These two facts make packet headers and load balancing hash functions, which are
difficult to obtain in real-time, unnecessary in predicting traffic distribution. Our intuition
is that hashing many flows onto a relatively small number of paths leads to even load bal-
ancing [Greenberg et al. (2009)]. As a result, a coarse-grained TM plus forwarding tables
should enable us to estimate the real traffic distribution with reasonably high accuracy.
We choose to represent a TM at the granularity of ToR-to-ToR traffic demands instead
of server-to-server, because this representation dramatically reduces the size of TM while
not affecting the computation of traffic distribution at the AGG or CORE layers.
Besides TMs, we also need the forwarding tables to know the next hops to any given
destination. As explained in Chapter 4.2, a DCN typically follows a hierarchical structure
with traffic traversing valley-free paths. This inspires us to infer the forwarding tables
in a similar manner, as illustrated in Figure 4.4. In the first bottom-up iteration, every
switch learns the routes to its descendant ToRs from its direct children. In the second top-
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FIGURE 4.4: A switch learns the equal cost next hops to any ToR after two iterations in a
hierarchical DCN topology.
down iteration, every switch learns the routes to the non-descendant ToRs. After these two
iterations, every switch builds up the full forwarding table to any ToRs in the network.
Algorithm 5: node.Forwardploadq
1: if load.dst  node
2: return; // reach the destination;
3: nxtHops  node.Lookuppload.dstq
4: for each node n in nxtHops
5: for each link l between node and n
6: subload.dst  load.dst;
7: subload.volume  load.volume|nxtHops|  1|links between node and n| ;
8: n.Forwardpsubloadq;
We use the term load to refer to the traffic demand between two ToRs. Algorithm 5
node.Forward presents how a node forwards a load in detail. Line 3 returns all the next
hops (nxthops) to a destination. Assuming even load balancing for traffic crossing adjacent
levels in the network hierarchy, Lines 4-8 first evenly split load among the nxthops, and
then for each next hop, the traffic is evenly split among the physical links. The second
traffic split is necessary due to the presence of LAGs (described in Chapter 4.2). By
running this algorithm on each load in TM and aggregating the contribution of each load
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on each link, we predict all the link utilizations.
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FIGURE 4.5: The differences between the link utilizations read from SNMP counters and
those computed by Impact Estimator are within 4%.
We evaluate Algorithm 5 node.Forward in an 8000-server production DCN to see
whether the Impact Estimator is accurate. We log one-month’s socket events on all the
servers and aggregate the logs into ToR-to-ToR traffic matrices at a 10-minute granularity.
We also collect the link utilizations during the same month via SNMP at a 10-minute
granularity. Figure 4.5 shows the CDF of the relative differences between the estimated
link utilizations and the measured ground truth. As can be seen, the Impact Estimator
works very well, and has a maximum error rate of 4%.
So far, we have explained how the Impact Estimator works under a known network
topology and TM . To predict the impact of an action, we need to know the new topology
and TM after the action is committed. Although inferring the new topology is straight-
forward, predicting the new TM can be tricky because a mitigation action might affect
the traffic demand from minutes up to days. For a restart action which takes only several
minutes, we use the TM in the most recent time interval (e.g., 10 minutes) to predict the
action’s impact during the restart period, assuming the TM is unlikely to change dramat-
ically in such a short time. For a deactivation action that may last days, due to a faulty
component needing to be replaced, we ideally desire to use the TM ’s in the future days to
predict the impact during the deactivation period. However, traffic prediction is a research
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topic by itself, and is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we use the TMs in the most
recent n days before a deactivation action to predict the impact in the future n days, as-
suming that the traffic demands are stable over 2n days when n is small. In our evaluation
(Chapter 4.6.5), we find that this simple heuristic works reasonably well.
4.4.3 Planning Mitigation
Given that NetPilot takes a trial-and-error approach toward failure mitigation, it needs a
mitigation planner to localize suspected components and prioritize mitigation actions to
minimize the number of trials. One simple solution is to use existing work [Kandula et al.
(2005a); Bahl et al. (2007); Kandula et al. (2009a)] to localize failures and then iteratively
try deactivating or restarting the suspected components. Although this simple, failure-
agnostic solution might work, we choose to develop a mitigation planner that uses failure-
specific knowledge to achieve finer-grained localization and more meaningful ordering of
mitigation actions (i.e., based on success likelihood). This in turn leads to fewer trials and
shorter mitigation times. The downside is that NetPilot needs a planning module for each
type of failure. However, we consider this trade-off worthwhile since there are relatively
few types of critical failures in DCNs (as shown in Table 4.1).
In the presentation that follows, we first describe in detail mitigation planning for three
types of failures: FCS errors, link-down, and uneven-split. We will then discuss the other
failure types (listed in Table 4.1), which are easier to handle compared to these three types.
Frame Checksum Errors
Many of the links in a DCN are optical. When foreign material such as dust gets between
an optical cable and its connector, the packets traversing the optical link can suffer bit
flips. This causes a frame to mismatch its checksum. As shown in Table 4.1, FCS errors
occur frequently in DCNsp and can significantly degrade performance. Figure 4.6 shows
how a corrupted link impacts the application-level latency in DCNp. Around 12:00pm, a
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FIGURE 4.6: The 99-percentile application-level latency increases significantly due to
one corrupted link in DCNp.
link connecting a ToR and an AGG switch began to corrupt 1% of all packets. This 1%
corruption rate leads to a 4.5 times increase in the 99th percentile latency for applications
running under that ToR.
Although replacing the faulty cable is the ultimate solution, this could take days de-
pending on staff availability. Operators can mitigate the failure by disabling the faulty link
before it is replaced. However, identifying the faulty link is challenging due to the wide
use of cut-through switching [cut (2008)] in DCNs. Because cut-through switches start
forwarding a frame before they can verify its checksum, switches can distribute corrupted
packets across the network before the corrupted packets are detected locally.
Figure 4.7 exemplifies how cut-through switching affects FCS errors in DCNp. The
operators began to observe many corrupted packets around hour 6.5, when 28 ports’ error
rates exceed 1%. Over the next 3.5 hours, operators were busy deactivating the suspected
ports one-by-one to determine the faulty links. Finally around hour 10, they found and
deactivated the two offending ports and the link error rates returned to normal afterward.
Mitigating FCS errors. Our solution is based on two observations. First, errors are
conserved on cut-through switches that have no faulty links, i.e., the number of incoming
corrupted packets should match the number of outgoing corrupted packets. This observa-
tion holds because packet losses are uncommon and broadcast/multicast packets account
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FIGURE 4.7: Each point shows a link’s error rate. Darker dots indicate higher error
rates. We highlight two areas that have the highest error rates (¡1%) in 28 links. They are
caused by two corrupted links in DCNp, and it took the operators 3.5 hours and 11 trials
to deactivate the two offending links.
for only a tiny fraction of the total traffic in DCNsp. Second, the error rate of each faulty
link is small and the number of simultaneous faulty links is small. Therefore, it is unlikely
that multiple faulty links contribute to the corruption of one packet.
Based on these two observations, we design an FCS error propagation model to localize
faulty links. We use xl to denote link l’s corruption rate, pl and el for the total number of
packets and the number of corrupted packets traversing l respectively, and mkl for the
fraction of packets coming from link k that also traverse link l. Note that the number of
corrupted packets coming from link l is equal to the number of packets corrupted by l plus
the number of packets corrupted by other links that traverse l. By ignoring the packets
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corrupted by multiple links, we have:
el 
¸
kl
pk xk mkl   pl xl (4.1)
We use the same technique as that of the Impact Estimator to compute mkl. el, pk and
pl can be obtained from SNMP counters. Thus, the linear equations (4.1) provide the
same number of constraints as the number of variables (xl’s). If we get a unique solution,
the faulty links are those with non-zero xls. If the solutions are not unique, we simply
pick one with the smallest number of non-zero xls based on the fact that the number of
simultaneous faulty links is usually small. Our evaluation shows that this approach works
well in practice with very few false positives (§4.6.3).
Link-down and Uneven-split
Even when the network has the capacity to handle the offered load, link overloading may
still occur due to load imbalance or link failure, leading to packet losses and high latencies
in DCNs.
Link-down: When one link in a LAGx is down, the LAGx will redistribute the traffic
to the remaining links. Since this process is transparent to higher layer protocols, traffic
demands remain the same over LAGx. Thus, LAGx can become overloaded. One mit-
igation strategy is to deactivate the entire LAGx and have the traffic re-routed via other
LAGs to the nxthops (defined in §4.4.2). Another strategy is to deactivate all the LAGs
(including LAGx) to the nxthops and re-route the traffic to other switches.
Uneven-split: Due to software or hardware bugs, a switch may unevenly split traffic
among the nxthops or the links in a LAG. In DCNsp, we sometimes observe extreme traffic
imbalance such as when one link in a lag carries 5Gb/s more traffic than any of the other
links in the LAG. While the exact root causes might be unknown, operators have found
that restarting the LAG or switches on either end rebalances the traffic (at least for some
period of time).
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FIGURE 4.8: Each point indicates a link overloading incident in a LAG caused by load
imbalance in a production DCN. We highlight two incidents. The first, which occurred
around hour 10, was due to uneven-split and was mitigated by restarting a switch. The
other, which occurred around hour 16, was due to link-down and was mitigated by deacti-
vating a LAG.
Figure 4.8 illustrates that both types of failures are common in DCNp. We collect
all the link utilizations every 10 minutes for one day in DCNp. In this figure, each dot
represents a LAG that meets the following two conditions in a 10-minute interval: 1) at
least one link is overloaded (utilization ¡ 90%); and 2) at least one link is broken (link-
down) or the difference between the maximum and mean link utilizations exceeds 5%
(uneven-split). We choose 5% as the load imbalance threshold because Figure 4.5 not
only suggests that accurate impact estimation is feasible but also suggests that large load
variance (¡ 5%) within a LAG is a strong indication of the traffic imbalance problem. We
highlight two incidents in Figure 4.8: one uneven-split failure mitigated by a switch restart
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around hour 10 and another link-down failure mitigated by a LAG deactivation around
hour 16.
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FIGURE 4.9: The first plan deactivates one LAG but still causes downward traffic loss.
The second plan deactivates two LAGs without causing any traffic loss.
Mitigating a link-down or uneven-split requires some care due to the complexity of
the traffic matrix and topology, as exemplified in Figure 4.9. Each pair of switches is
connected by a LAG consisting of two physical links with a combined capacity of two
units. There are six units of upward traffic from agga to the cores and twelve units of
downward traffic from cores to aggs. Suppose one link between agga and corea is down,
halving the corresponding LAG capacity, resulting in 0.5 unit of upward traffic loss. One
obvious mitigation strategy (Plan 1) is to deactivate the entire LAG between agga and
corea. Although this prevents the upward traffic loss, it causes one unit of downward
traffic loss between corea and aggb. The correct strategy is to deactivate the LAG between
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corea and aggb as well (Plan 2). This will shift the downward traffic via corea to the other
cores and prevent traffic loss in both directions.
Mitigating link-down. NetPilot mitigates link-down failures by estimating the impact
of all possible deactivation actions and carrying out the ones with the least impact, i.e.,
minimizing maximum link utilization. Because a link could be down for n days, NetPilot
needs to estimate an action’s impact during the downtime. To do so, NetPilot uses the
traffic matrices of the most recent n days (Chapter 4.4.2) as an approximation. Such a
computation is difficult for human operators to perform because the number of mitigation
actions and traffic matrices to consider in concert could be quite large.
Mitigating uneven-split. NetPilot mitigates uneven-split failures by restarting LAGs
or switches. To limit the temporal interruptions during restarts, NetPilot prioritizes the
restart sequence based on a restart’s estimated impact, while also assuming a component
cannot carry any traffic during restart. Since restarting one component usually takes only
a few minutes, NetPilot uses the traffic matrix in the most recent time interval (e.g., 10
minutes) as an approximation of the traffic matrix during the restart. After exhaustively
calculating the impact for every possible restart, the planner will first carry out the action
with the least estimated impact. If this action does not mitigate the failure, the planner will
re-prioritize the remaining options based on the latest traffic matrix.
Other Types of Failures
FCS error, link-down, and uneven-split are by no means all the failures that NetPilot can
mitigate. We carefully review all the critical failures in Table 4.1 and find 62% of them
can be localized via available data sources (such as SNMP counters and syslogs) and can
be mitigated via deactivation or restart. The only exceptions are the failures due to con-
figuration errors (38%). Although configuration errors on a single switch can be mitigated
by deactivating the misconfigured switch, identifying if a configuration error involves one
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or multiple switches still requires human intervention. We briefly discuss how to apply
NetPilot to mitigate other failures:
Link layer loop: Due to switch software bugs, link layer protocols sometimes never
converge and cause severe broadcast storms. This failure can be localized by identifying
the switches which become suddenly overloaded but experience little traffic demand in-
crease. The mitigation strategy is to deactivate one of the afflicted ports or switches to
restore a loop-free physical topology.
Unstable power: Failures due to unstable power are localized by searching syslogs
for unexpected switch-down events. They can be mitigated by deactivating the switches
impacted by unstable power.
Failures due to unknown reasons: Such failures account for 23% of all critical fail-
ures. Even if their root causes are unknown, they can be easily localized to a single switch
and mitigated by a restart. For example, a switch that stops forwarding can be identified
once the difference between its received and delivered bytes exceeds a threshold. It is also
straightforward to identify a switch that loses its configuration or suffers from high CPU
utilization.
4.5 NetPilot Implementation
NetPilot’s primary implementation challenge is reliability. As a failure mitigation system,
NetPilot itself must be robust to failures. We build NetPilot as a pipeline of five inde-
pendent processes, as shown in Figure 4.10. These processes include a failure detector
(Chapter 4.5.1), failure aggregator (Chapter 4.5.2), planner (Chapter 4.5.3), impact esti-
mator (Chapter 4.5.4), and plan executor (Chapter 4.5.5). Each process records its relevant
state to a replicated database so that the state can survive server crashes. Operators can
also use the recorded state to determine ex post facto why NetPilot took specific actions.
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FIGURE 4.10: NetPilot implementation overview.
4.5.1 Failure Detector
The failure detector uses three data sources to detect failures: SNMP traps [snm (2002)],
switch and port counters, and syslogs [Lonvick (2001)]. The detector then applies failure-
specific criteria to evaluate whether a failure has occurred. For example, the failure de-
tector looks at the bytes-in and dropped-packets counters of a port to determine if a link
is overloaded. In our implementation, values from the above data sources are processed
every five minutes.
When the failure detector detects a failure, it updates the database with the following
information: the type of detected failure, data sources used to detect the failure, and the
components that exhibit abnormal behaviors. Note that these components are not neces-
sarily the faulty components, because the failure effects may propagate to healthy compo-
nents, e.g., a broken link may cause overload and hence packet losses at other links.
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4.5.2 Failure Aggregator
Because the failure detector runs continuously and NetPilot takes a trial-and-error ap-
proach, we expect that the same failure will be detected multiple times before it is miti-
gated. NetPilot therefore needs a mechanism to decide whether a detected failure instance
is a new or ongoing failure.
The failure aggregator compares a newly reported failure instance against all the on-
going failures recorded in the database. If it determines that the newly reported instance
has not been mitigated before – determined by the failure type and components involved
– it updates the database and marks the failure as ready for mitigation. If it has seen the
failure and the planner is taking a mitigation action, it marks the instance as requiring no
further action. If it has seen the failure and the planner has taken a mitigation action for
the failure, it flags the failure as unsuccessfully mitigated. The planner may then try the
next mitigation action if there is one available.
The failure aggregator does not remove the failure instance created by the failure de-
tector, but simply marks that it has been processed so that an operator can examine the
initial failure detection as well as the choices made by the failure aggregator later on.
4.5.3 Planner
The planner takes three steps to choose a mitigation action. First, it employs failure-
specific modules to localize a failure to a set of suspected components. Second, it generates
the appropriate mitigation actions against all suspected components. Third, it uses the
impact estimator to estimate the impact of these actions, ranks them based on their impact
or success likelihood, and then executes the best one. At the end of each step, the planner
updates the database with its computation results for post-analysis.
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4.5.4 Impact Estimator
The impact estimator implements the algorithm presented in Chapter 4.4.2. It uses the run-
time DCN topology and historical TMs to compute online server ratio, max link util,
and total lost pkt. We extract the run-time topology from device configurations and run-
ning state (i.e., up/down). It includes both the physical and logical device connections such
as a LAG that comprises multiple physical links and a virtual switch that comprises multi-
ple physical switches. The traffic matrices are continuously collected via socket event logs
on each server and are aggregated to ToR-to-ToR traffic matrices at a 10-minute granular-
ity.
4.5.5 Plan Executor
Once the planner chooses a mitigation action, the plan executor is engaged to take the ac-
tion. The executor translates the action into a series of commands recognized by switches.
As the commands are vendor-specific, we create a vendor-specific configlet file that in-
cludes the commands for each mitigation action. A configlet file parameterizes configura-
tion arguments such as port number, so it can be reused to take the same action on different
switches or ports. We also implement a library that allows the executor to send commands
to switches via both in-band and out-of-band channels. After an action is taken, the ex-
ecutor updates the database to record the time when the action was taken and whether the
action was successfully applied to the switch.
4.5.6 Interactions with Operators
NetPilot is fully capable of mitigating failures without human intervention. Nonetheless,
NetPilot is explicitly designed to record the inputs and outputs of each mitigation step in
a manner that is readily accessible to operators. Operators can later examine the decisions
at each step. This design helps them debug and understand counterintuitive mitigation
actions. Moreover, it helps reveal failures that are repeatedly mitigated for only a short
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period of time.
4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we show that NetPilot can quickly and automatically mitigate several types
of critical failures in DCNs. After presenting our experimental methodology, we first con-
duct three end-to-end experiments to highlight that, compared with the approach used by
today’s operators in DCNsp, NetPilot can mitigate failures faster and with less disruption.
Then we conduct more detailed experiments to illustrate the three reasons why NetPilot
outperforms the status quo: effective failure localization, accurate impact estimation, and
action prioritization that minimizes disruption.
4.6.1 Experimental Methodology
We conduct four types of experiments to study various key aspects of NetPilot: 1) failure-
replay, for failures with operation logs, we feed the device counters and traffic matrices
when failures occurred in DCNp into NetPilot and compare NetPilot’s actions with the
actions that were actually taken by the operators; 2) heuristic-replay, for failures without
operation logs, we feed the device counters and traffic matrices when failures occurred
in DCNp into NetPilot and an operator’s approach and compare their actions; 3) testbed,
we inject traffic and failures into a testbed and compare the actions taken by NetPilot with
those taken by operators; 4) simulation, we use large scale simulations to compare NetPilot
and the operator’s approach in the face of multiple simultaneous failures.
Operator’s Approach
For failures with operation logs created by operators, we can directly compare NetPilot’s
actions with the actual operator’s actions. For failures without operation logs, we build a
model of how operators would mitigate the failures based on discussions with DCNsp’s
operators and our observations. We first carefully review the failures with operation logs
101
and enumerate the typical action sequences for the types of failures discussed in Chap-
ter 4.4.3. We then have operators explain the reasoning behind each sequence of actions.
We summarize the operator’s heuristics for mitigating each type of failure and estimating
impact below.
Estimating impact: When deactivating a link or switch, all of its traffic will fail over
evenly among its redundant components. Components not in the same redundancy group
have no change in traffic. Because manual computation is slow and error-prone, operators
cannot afford to compute the traffic changes that are more than one hop away from the
deactivated component.
Mitigating FCS errors: Identify the switches having significantly more corrupted
packets of outgoing than incoming, and then deactivate their ports in the descending order
of error rate.
Mitigating uneven-split: Try restarting LAGs first and then switches, because opera-
tors believe restarting a switch is likely to have greater impact.
Mitigating link-down: Compute the impact of each possible action under the latest
traffic loads using the impact estimation heuristic above, and then execute the action with
the least impact.
Experimental Setup
Our data for the failure-replay and heuristic-replay experiments come from DCNsp, sev-
eral large production DCNs using the scale-out topology for which operators log critical
failures with details and mitigation actions. We collected six months of device counters
via SNMP at 5-minute intervals. We also logged the socket events on all servers during the
same six months and aggregated the logs into ToR-to-ToR traffic matrices at a 10-minute
granularity.
As shown in Figure 4.11, our testbed is a mini version of DCNp’s scale-out topology
with all the important characteristics preserved. It has a hierarchical structure with two
102


	



	



	


 	




	




	






	

	



	



	


 	






 
	
FIGURE 4.11: The testbed topology.
containers. The connections between containers and COREs form a full mesh running
BGP ECMP for load balancing. We use multi-chassis LAG to virtualize the AGGd switch
pairs and VRRP to virtualize the AGGu switch pairs in the same container. Each connec-
tion above AGGd is a LAG with four 10Gb/s physical links and each connection between
a ToR and an AGGd is one 10Gb/s physical link. Unlike the topology in Figure 4.1, the
testbed topology has 1) two AGG levels: AGGu andAGGd, and 2) one traffic generator in-
stead of multiple servers under each ToR. The traffic generators can either inject arbitrary
traffic or replay real server traffic traces captured in DCNp.
Our simulator for the simulation experiments use the same topology and traffic ma-
trix data as the failure-replay experiments. However, we inject hypothetical failures and
compare the actions taken by NetPilot and the operator’s approach.
4.6.2 End-to-End Failure Mitigation
In this section, we compare the state-of-the-art manual failure mitigation by operators with
NetPilot for three failure incidents in DCNsp. We are limited by the number of available
operation logs to conduct a large-scale comparison. Nevertheless, from the failure inci-
dents we examined, we expect that NetPilot’s improvement shown in these examples is
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highly representative.
FCS error. Figure 4.7 shows the timeline of operators mitigating an FCS error in-
cident. The operators iteratively tried deactivating links that had a significant error rate.
Without an Impact Estimator, they performed manual calculations to ensure the remaining
links would not become overloaded when they deactivated a link. It took a team of expe-
rienced operators nearly 3.5 hours and 10 unsuccessful trials to deactivate the two faulty
links. In contrast, a failure-replay experiment shows that NetPilot can pinpoint and deac-
tivate the two troublesome links in less than 15 minutes without any human intervention.
Overload due to link-down. Figure 4.8 depicts an incident of overloaded link caused
by link-down. This incident persisted for almost 6 hours before the operators mitigated it
by deactivating a LAG. The mitigation action was repeatedly delayed because the oper-
ator’s manual impact estimation was inaccurate and informed them that deactivating the
LAG would be worse than taking no action at all. After six hours of continually re-running
their impact estimation, the operators deactivated the LAG around hour 16.
In contrast, a failure-replay experiment shows that NetPilot finds an alternative action
that would have mitigated the incident soon after the failure was detected, which is almost
5.5 hours ahead of the operator’s action. This is possible only because NetPilot’s Impact
Estimator is faster and more accurate and thus can exhaustively explore all options. This
improved accuracy allows NetPilot to take actions that operators would have erroneously
excluded.
Overload due to uneven-split. A known bug in the software that runs on the AGGus
causes them to occasionally stop generating routing updates. This in turn causes the
COREs to cease forwarding traffic to the afflicted AGGus even though the links are up.
Because it is difficult to consistently reproduce the exact same scenario in a testbed exper-
iment, we emulate it by misconfiguring an AGGu’s ACL to block the TCP connections to
the COREs. Under this setting, COREs’ routing table entries with the afflicted AGGu as
the next hop will expire and most of the traffic will be sent to the other AGGu in the same
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afflicted container.
NetPilot detects this problem as an uneven-split incident and attempts to mitigate it by
restarting switches. Because we only install the ACL rules in the running configuration
and not the startup configuration, the problem will be mitigated upon switch restart.
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FIGURE 4.12: NetPilot mitigates link overloading due to uneven-split after restarting
three switches.
Figure 4.12 shows the end-to-end mitigation process. We inject the uneven-split failure
at minute 5 of the trace. Because switch counters are pushed to NetPilot once every 5
minutes, NetPilot responds at a granularity of 5 minutes. The first problem is identified at
minute 15 because the failure aggregator waits for two consecutive counter values before
declaring a failure. Approximately 5 seconds later, the planner finishes generating a list
of possible actions, estimating the impact of each action via the Impact Estimator, and
executing the one with the least impact. When the next set of counters gets pushed to
NetPilot, the planner notices that the problem has not been mitigated and starts the next
round of planning, excluding the actions that have already been taken. Five minutes later,
the planner again notices the failure persists. As a result, it starts a third round of planning
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and mitigates the failure after restarting the third switch. Even though the first two actions
are incorrect, NetPilot can mitigate the failure in approximately 20 minutes, which is still
much faster than engaging the operators and manually restarting the suspected switches.
4.6.3 Fine-grained Failure Localization
In this section, we show that NetPilot can expedite the mitigation process using its fine-
grained failure localization. We compare NetPilot’s FCS model described in §4.4.3 against
three alternative approaches: 1) Greedy deactivation, in which links are deactivated in the
order of decreasing error rate; 2) Operator’s approach, which is described in §4.6.1; and
3) Exhaustive search, in which we try deactivating every possible combination of the links
on the switches that violate the error conservation constraint, from one up to three links
in each combination, in the order of decreasing combined error rate. If deactivating one
combination fails to mitigate the failure, we roll back the ineffective link deactivations and
try deactivating the next combination.
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FIGURE 4.13: This figure compares the number of trials needed by different approaches
to localize two simultaneously corrupted links in our testbed.
We design the first set of testbed experiments to show the number of attempts needed
by each of the four algorithms to mitigate FCS errors. In each of the six experiments,
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we pick two links in the testbed and use a commercial FCS error injector to corrupt 1%
of all packets that traverse the two links. Two simultaneous faulty links in a large-scale
DCN is common, as there are tens or hundreds of thousands of links. We repeat each
experiment ten times using different traffic matrices. The histogram in Figure 4.13 shows
the median number of trials for each experiment, while the error bars mark the maximum
and minimum number of trials.
In almost all cases, NetPilot can accurately locate the two corrupted links in one trial.
In two out of the sixty experiments, NetPilot identifies three links, the two malfunctioning
links and one false positive link. This is far more effective than the operator’s approach that
will cumulatively deactivate two to five links before disabling the corrupted links. On the
other hand, because the exhaustive search will roll back the ineffective link deactivations,
it will eventually mitigate the FCS errors without having any healthy link deactivated.
However, the disruption caused to the network by the tens of trials is significant.
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FIGURE 4.14: This figure shows the CDFs of the number of trials needed by different
approaches to localize three simultaneously corrupted links. NetPilot significantly outper-
forms the others.
In the testbed experiments, we can only corrupt two links simultaneously due to the
limitations of the FCS error injector. We use simulation to simulate more than two cor-
rupted links in a much larger network, i.e., DCNp. We perform fifty simulations. In each
simulation we randomly pick three links and set their corruption rates to be uniformly
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distributed between 1% and 5% (typically observed in DCNp). NetPilot’s FCS model can
uniquely localize the three corrupted links in 96% of the cases. For the remaining 4%,
NetPilot localizes the three corrupted links plus one false positive link. Figure 4.14 shows
that compared to NetPilot, other approaches require far more trials to mitigate just three
simultaneously corrupted links. We omit the results from exhaustive search because its
search space is too large and the simulations cannot finish in a reasonable amount of time.
To study the localization accuracy of NetPilot’s FCS model in the real world, we replay
the traffic matrices and switch counters from 78 DCNsp’s FCS error instances on NetPilot.
NetPilot can generate unique solutions and accurately localize the corrupted links in over
90% of the instances. In the remaining 10% of the instances, the solutions are not unique
because the failure-time traffic matrices do not provide sufficient constraints for the linear
equations, e.g., we cannot tell if a link is corrupted when there is no traffic on it. For
these cases, we pick the solution with the smallest number of non-zero corruption rates, as
discussed in Chapter 4.4.3. We find this approach works well with the maximum one-link
false positives.
4.6.4 Accurate Impact Estimation
In §4.4.2, we showed that NetPilot can accurately estimate link utilizations when no mit-
igation action is taken. We now conduct testbed experiments to show that NetPilot can
accurately predict link utilizations as well as packet losses after device deactivations. We
compare NetPilot with the operator’s approach under five types of component deactiva-
tion: a randomly selected physical link, a LAG between an AGGd and an AGGu, a LAG
between an AGGu and a CORE switch, an AGGd switch, and an AGGu switch. For each
deactivation type, we repeat the experiments under 144 different traffic matrices generated
as follows. First, we collect the ToR-to-ToR traffic matrices from DCNp at a 10-minute
granularity for one day. Then we use a modulo-16 hash function (16 is the number of ToRs
in the testbed) to map the ToRs in DCNp to the ToRs in the testbed. Finally, we map the
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ToR-to-ToR traffic matrices from DCNp to the testbed and scale down the traffic volume
by a scaling factor. We use a scaling factor that leads to no packet loss in the testbed to
study how well NetPilot estimates link utilizations. We use a different scaling factor that
leads to packet losses to study how well NetPilot estimates packet losses.
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FIGURE 4.15: This figure compares the median and maximum relative errors of NetPi-
lot’s estimations of the maximum link utilization after deactivating various network com-
ponents with those of the operator’s manual approach. NetPilot has low estimation errors.
Figure 4.15 compares the relative errors of NetPilot’s link utilization prediction with
that of the operator’s approach when there is no loss in the testbed. The relative error
is defined as the difference between a predicted value and the value read from a switch
counter normalized by a link’s capacity: predictionswitch counter
link capacity
.
NetPilot’ median and maximum relative errors are less than 2.5% and 5% respectively.
Although the median relative errors of the operator’s approach are only slightly higher, its
maximum relative errors can often exceed 20%. The main reason is that the operator’s
approach cannot predict the significant traffic load increase on links that are multiple hops
away from a deactivated component.
Figure 4.16 is similar to Figure 4.15 except that we scale the traffic matrices to lead
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FIGURE 4.16: This figure compares the median and maximum relative errors of NetPilot’s
packet loss estimations with those of the operator’s approach when deactivating various
network components. Again NetPilot achieves low estimation errors.
to packet losses in the network. We also replace the case of deactivating a single physical
link with the case of deactivating both an AGGd and AGGu, since the former rarely leads
to packet losses. Again NetPilot’s loss prediction has median and maximum relative errors
below 5% and 8% respectively. Yet, the maximum relative error of the operator’s approach
is always more than double NetPilot’s.
4.6.5 Effective Action Planning
When mitigating a failure, NetPilot must carefully choose the order of actions to minimize
network disruption. In this section, we show that correctly ordering mitigation actions is
challenging and often contradicts the operator’s intuition.
We first compare NetPilot with the operator’s approach when mitigating uneven-split
failures. We collect all the link utilizations at a 10-minute granularity from DCNp for one
year and identify 151 uneven-split incidents by applying two criteria: 1) the difference
between the maximum and mean link utilizations in the same LAG exceeds 5% (the same
threshold used in §4.4.3); 2) the difference above lasts at least thirty minutes. Because
some of these incidents did not cause link overload and thus were not investigated by oper-
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ators, we do not know which component was responsible. Therefore, we randomly assign
one “responsible” component to each incident and conduct heuristic-replay experiments.
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FIGURE 4.17: This figure compares the CDFs of the maximum link utilizations when
NetPilot and operators restart components to mitigate the uneven-split failures. NetPilot
causes lower maximum link utilizations during the failure mitigation period.
In these experiments, we emulate the operator’s approach by first restarting LAGs and
then switches (§4.6.1), whereas NetPilot exhaustively compares all possible actions under
the latest TM and picks the one with the least impact (§4.4.3).
We use the CDFs of the maximum link utilizations under both approaches during the
failure mitigation periods to compare NetPilot with the operator’s approach, as shown
in Figure 4.17. Because we randomly assign faulty components, it takes NetPilot and
the operator’s approach on average the same number of trials to successfully mitigate an
uneven-split failure. Therefore, the failure mitigation periods under both approaches are
roughly the same. The approach with lower maximum link utilizations is a better approach.
For ease of presentation, we represent packet losses as link utilizations greater than 100%.
As can be seen, for 60% of the incidents, NetPilot is far less disruptive than the operator’s
approach. NetPilot never overloads links while the operator’s approach would lead to
traffic losses in 20% of the incidents.
Unlike uneven-split failures, link-down failures are mitigated by deactivations in which
the deactivated components may remain down for days. The operator’s approach uses the
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latest TM right before the actions to estimate the impact of deactivations, and to choose
the actions with the least negative impact. NetPilot has two main advantages over this ap-
proach: 1) it can use multiple TMs that better approximate future TMs in the deactivation
periods to estimate impact; and 2) its impact estimation is more accurate (§ 4.6.4).
Although we have shown NetPilot’s impact estimation is more accurate in the previous
subsection, we further use a failure-replay experiment to show that more accurate impact
estimation can lead to less disruptive mitigation actions. We replay 97 link-down incidents
observed in DCNsp during one year. For each incident, NetPilot uses the same TM as
the operator does to estimate the impact of a deactivation action. We then compare the
resulting maximum link utilizations right after NetPilot’s deactivation actions with those
from the real failure traces.
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FIGURE 4.18: This figure shows the CDFs of the maximum link utilizations right after
each method takes its deactivation action to mitigate link-down failures in DCNp. NetPilot
outperforms other methods because its impact estimation is more accurate.
Figure 4.18 shows the comparison results. As can be seen, NetPilot’s actions are no-
ticeably better than the actual actions taken by the operators or taking no action at all.
These results suggest that NetPilot’s higher estimation accuracy can lead to less disruptive
mitigation actions.
Next, we run testbed experiments to show that using multiple TMs to approximate
future TMs during a device’s deactivation period can also lead to less disruptive mitigation
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FIGURE 4.19: This figure compares the accumulated packet losses in a 24-hour period
right after a deactivation action is taken in our testbed. When using multiple historical
TMs to approximate future TMs, NetPilot leads to the fewest packet losses.
actions. In these experiments, we inject link-down failures in the testbed by shutting down
half of the physical links in a LAG either between an AGGd and an AGGu or between an
AGGu and a CORE. We then use the 144 TMs from the preceding 24 hours, rather than
just the TM right before a deactivation action, to plan mitigation actions. We then measure
the packet losses during the following 24 hours using the TMs in those hours.
Figure 4.19 presents the packet losses under each method. As can be seen, NetPilot has
the fewest packet losses when using multiple historical TMs to approximate future TMs.
4.7 Conclusion
NetPilot is a system that automatically mitigates DCN failures. It is a departure from the
status quo that relies heavily on human intervention. We believe that our work is critical
to managing modern DCNs given the ballooning number of devices in these DCNs and
the trend towards commodity hardware. NetPilot works by identifying a candidate set of
afflicted components that are likely to cause a problem and iteratively taking mitigation
actions targeting each one until the problem is alleviated. A key insight that makes this
approach viable is the redundancy presented in modern DCN topologies. This redundancy
reduces the potential for any single deactivated or rebooted component to disrupt a net-
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work. Our experiments show that NetPilot can successfully detect and mitigate several
common types of failures both in a testbed and in a real production DCN.
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5Conclusion
In conclusion, we target two primary challenges in managing modern datacenters: how to
design a practical datacenter network architecture and how to achieve fast network failure
recovery. We propose DARD and MPXCP to solve the first challenge and NetPilot to solve
the second challenge. In this chapter, we summarize the key contributions of the thesis.
To the best of our knowledge, DARD is the first distributed adaptive routing archi-
tecture for datacenters. Our contributions are: 1) We justify four design guidelines for
practical datacenter architectures and explain the pros and cons of existing solutions. 2)
We design DARD, which is proven to converge to a Nash equilibrium in finite steps and
with bounded gap to the optimal flow allocation. 3) We conduct intensive evaluation in
both testbed and simulation to show DARD’s quick convergence, high bisection bandwidth
and small control overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, MPXCP is the first explicit multipath congestion control
protocol. Our contribution lies in three aspects: 1) We discover MPTCP’s performance
degradation in four aspects: slow convergence, inefficiency, being biased against long-
RTT flows and large queue size. 2) We explore the design space to address MPTCP’s four
performance degradations. We further design MPXCP to efficiently and fairly utilize the
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capacity despite different delay and bandwidth products. 3) We implement MPXCP in
ns-2. Through intensive evaluation, we confirm that MPXCP outperforms MPTCP in the
face of large delay-bandwidth product.
To the best of our knowledge, NetPilot is the first automated failure mitigation system
for datacenter networks. Our contributions are: 1) We study and classify the high-impact
failures in production datacenter networks over a six-month period, and find that we can
mitigate most of those failures by simple actions such as restart or deactivation. We also
find that there is sufficient redundancy in a DCN to accommodate the impact of mitigation
actions. 2) We design and implement NetPilot and deploy it in a testbed that resembles a
real datacenter network topology. We also conduct simulations using data from produc-
tion to evaluate NetPilot at a large scale. We experimentally validate the accuracy of the
Impact Estimator, and find that it offers an error rate of less than 8%. 3) We use NetPilot to
automatically mitigate three types of high-impact failures that operators often encounter in
production DCNs. Besides reducing operational overhead, NetPilot decreases the median
mitigation time from 2 hours to 20 minutes compared to current operational practice, sig-
nificantly shortening a failure’s impact on online services. 4) We justify the design choices
made in NetPilot. Compared to simple heuristics, NetPilot can succeed with fewer trials
while maintaining safe operating conditions in the network.
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